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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
Sustained economic growth in developing countries typically requires structural transformation, which 
involves the movement of resources, including labour and financial capital, from low to higher 
productivity activities. The market is the basic mechanism for resource reallocation into the 
manufacturing sector accordingly. Scientific and policy studies, however, suggest that governments 
must play an active role in coordinating investments for industrial upgrading and diversification. 
Against this background, DFID has acknowledged the importance of the development of the 
manufacturing sector within the countries in which DFID has a presence and is able to support 
structural transformation by increasing manufacturing productivity and the share that manufacturing 
contributes to GDP. 
Global trends in the past decades show that China emerged as the global factory of the world. 
However, the recent trend is the decline in the share of manufacturing in global GDP paralleled by an 
expansion in the corresponding share of services. A related recent trend is ongoing deindustrialization 
in almost all advanced economies including China as well as Africa and Asia. Moreover, production 
jobs have moved to developing countries that are trapped in low-value-added activities and are locked 
out of the higher value-added activities in design, key technological inputs, and marketing. 
Although the manufacturing sector is often discussed as one sector in theory and policy and 
programme practice, in reality the sector is a heterogeneous collection of subsectors with differences 
in terms of products, technology and requirements as well as growth opportunities and societal 
impacts. Different subsectors imply different factor/input intensities, output markets, claims on 
infrastructure and short and long development prospects. Focusing on priority manufacturing 
subsectors in support programmes is an effective approach applied by leading donors and MOs. 
Upgrading the industrial structure in a given country’s subsector requires the upgrading of the factor 
endowment structure from one that is relatively abundant in labour and natural resources to one that 
is relatively abundant in capital, the introduction of new technologies, and the corresponding 
improvement in infrastructure to facilitate economic operations. Both domestic investment and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) investments can be strong complements.  
Countries and their manufacturing subsectors differ in their attraction to investments. Market-seeking 
investments might lead to higher local employment, but less international trade, whereas efficiency-
seeking investments might lead to both more employment and more international trade. Efficiency-
seeking FDI is particularly important for countries looking to integrate into the global economy and 
move up the value chain. Efficiency-seeking FDI is not only export-oriented, but also key to export 
diversification. Which position to take in the subsector selection, based on investment attraction, 
depends on the strategic choices and priorities in the broader development framework of the country 
in question. 
The development of a manufacturing programme framework starts with further assessment of the 
prospects and opportunities for selected subsectors. One way of selecting promising manufacturing 
subsectors is based on the comparative advantages determined. It is important to signal that 
comparative advantage is dynamic and changes over time. The complementing product space concept 
is the probability that a country will develop the capability to be good at producing one good based on 
the existing capability in the production of another similar, or nearby goods. The identification of the 
binding constraints, that hamper the subsector’s growth, could be addressed by applying an adapted 
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version Hausmann growth-diagnostic model. The complementing ‘enterprise map’ approach provides 
the suitable research tools. 
In the design of the log frame approaches and methodology, it is essential to include manufacturing-
specific indicators, both in programmes with a primary focus on manufacturing and generic private 
sector development programmes. Generic private sector support inputs, such as improving finance, 
infrastructure and the business climate, are critical for business in general, and for manufacturing as 
well. In addition, there are support inputs such as production technology, product manufacturing 
standards, subsector-focused integration in global value chains that relate more to manufacturing. The 
most evident (and used) measures of structural transformation are GDP, value added, employment, 
investment and export. The log frame inputs promoting manufacturing involve a comprehensive 
approach addressing various issues at various levels at the same time.  
Safeguarding society from harmful impacts as a result of manufacturing development is a prerequisite.  
Manufacturing programmes should explicitly promote gender equality. While women’s ownership in 
smallholder enterprises is widely seen in the informal sector in most developing countries, it is less 
common in more advanced and larger manufacturing industries.  Likewise, the representation of 
women in higher executive and management positions, including the higher qualified technical 
engineering jobs, is limited.  A related priority in the context of manufacturing promotion is creating 
stable jobs while safeguarding labour conditions and labour rights. Challenging working conditions in 
developing countries pose one of the more urgent questions around manufacturing promotion. Child 
labour is another notorious issue with regard to labour conditions in manufacturing. Promoting 
manufacturing often implies adverse environmental consequences through the release of air and water 
pollutants and the disposal of hazardous wastes.  
Regarding organisational implications, there is a large variation in DFID’s spending on manufacturing 
support programmes across countries. As DFID aims to develop a more substantial portfolio of 
manufacturing support programmes, more programmes with a primary and explicit focus on 
manufacturing are to be initiated and implemented. DFID country offices may increase their 
manufacturing spend for instance to average level of 10-15% of the overall country budget for 
economic development. With the exception of the fragile states and conflict areas (Yemen and South 
Sudan for instance), increased manufacturing activity is likely to be appropriate in Caribbean, DR 
Congo, Indonesia, Jordan, Kyrgyz republic, Lebanon, Malawi, Mozambique Myanmar, Pakistan, 
Tajikistan, Tanzania and Sierra Leone.  
Explicit internal coordination of manufacturing programmes, in particular the collection and sharing 
of economic data on subsectors and indicators, will assure an effective realisation of DFID’s 
ambitions. A logical step could be the establishment of an internal coordination point/platform within 
DFID that shares information and comparable insights of manufacturing programmes and the 
associated support approaches, best practices and so forth. Other donors and MOs work in a broad 
range of comparable areas and activities in manufacturing support. There is no formalized overarching 





Sustained economic growth in developing countries will not happen without structural 
transformation, which involves the movement of resources from low to higher productivity 
activities. Manufacturing plays a key role in this given it offers an opportunity for access to new 
technologies, development of skills and – through exports – a source of foreign exchange and 
access to large global markets. There is an important role for Governments to actively 
coordinate and facilitate investments for industrial upgrading and diversification. 
Over the past decades, development economists such as Hollis Chenery, and more recently Justin Yifu 
Lin, Dani Rodrik and Joseph Stiglitz have emphasized that sustained economic growth in developing 
countries cannot happen without structural changes in terms of economic industrial and services 
sectors. They stress the importance of structural transformation at the core of development debate.1 
This idea entails that an economy's structure of factor endowments evolves from one stage of 
development to another and requires ongoing structural transformation. Moreover, this transformation 
is not a dichotomy of two economic development stages ("poor" versus "rich" or "developing" versus 
"industrialized"); each stage of economic development is a point along the continuum from a low-
income agrarian economy to a high-income industrialized economy. The key idea is that the market is 
the basic mechanism for effective resource allocation. In addition to an effective market mechanism, 
they argue the Government should play an active role in facilitating industrial upgrading and 
infrastructure improvements. 
Structural transformation involves the movement of resources, including labour and financial capital, 
from low to higher productivity activities which, in turn, create better-paying jobs, raise incomes and 
reduce poverty. In order to create wealthy nations, structural transformation in terms of agricultural 
activity shifting towards manufacturing activity is essential. All countries that remain poor have failed 
to achieve structural transformation, that is, they have been unable to diversify away from agriculture 
and the production of traditional goods into manufacturing and other modern activities.  
Thus, a robust manufacturing sector2 is broadly understood as a fundamental path to economic growth 
and development.3 Manufacturing is assumed to be more dynamic than other sectors. Technological 
advance is concentrated in the manufacturing sector and diffuses from there to other economic sectors 
such as the service sector. It also provides the discipline needed for the labor force of a modern 
economy. Compared to agriculture and services, the argument runs that the manufacturing sector 
offers special opportunities for economies of scale and capital accumulation. Capital accumulation 
can be more easily realised in technology intensive and spatially concentrated manufacturing than in 
spatially dispersed agriculture.  
Moreover, export-oriented manufacturing, though FDI, forces firms to become internationally 
competitive instead of being protected within small domestic markets. It also allows firms to earn 
                                                        
1 Lin, J. Y. 2012. New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development and Policy. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
2 Manufacturing is defined as the physical or chemical transformation of materials or components into new products, 
whether the work is performed by power- driven machines or by hand, whether it is done in a factory or in the worker's 
home, and whether the products are sold at wholesale or retail. Included are assembly of component parts of 
manufactured products and recycling of waste materials. Source: https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1586. 
3 Cornwall, John. 1977. Modern Capitalism: Its Growth and Transformation. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
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foreign exchange and brings the potential for rapid expansion into deep global markets.4 Exporting 
firms could also adapt their activities by copying the example presented through FDI.5  
In Sub-Saharan Africa, which constitutes the core of the development challenge today, and low-
income countries in Asia, agriculture continues to play a dominant role, accounting for 63 percent of 
the labour force. Its share of manufacturing in 2005 was lower than in 1965 (Lin 2011). Recent 
empirical work confirms that the bulk of the difference in growth between Asia and developing 
countries in Latin America and Africa can be explained by the contribution of structural change to 
overall labour productivity (McMillan and Rodrik 2011). Economies such as China, India and 
Indonesia have risen into the top ranks of global manufacturing an in the world's 15 largest 
manufacturing economies.6 However, this narrative seems to exclude many African nations. Despite 
their manufacturing potential and promising trajectories, most African countries have a relative dearth 
of factories. This limited industrial development represents a missed opportunity for economic 
transformation and quality employment generation that alleviates poverty. The Brooking Institute 
suggests that Africa becomes the world’s next great manufacturing centre, potentially capturing part 
of the 100 million labour-intensive manufacturing jobs that will leave China by 2030 because of 
increased wages.7 
Traditional heavy manufacturing - ‘smokestack industry’ - was regarded as the key driver of structural 
transformation. However, economists John Page and Finn Tarp, amongst others, suggest that a broader 
definition of the higher productivity ‘modern sector’ is needed in thinking about structural 
transformation in Africa.8 Light manufacturing9 as well as modern tradable services, such as ICT-
based services, tourism, and transport and logistics, have the potential for strong within-sector 
productivity change and can contribute to raising productivity in other sectors of the economy. It 
should be noted that automation and modern services are to only be applicable to middle income 
countries and not to low income countries (or lower middle income countries) where the issue of job 
creation is critical and labor skills are too low. 10 This suggests that low income countries are only able 
to develop through industrialization. Agro-industrial production and horticulture offer the potential 
for productivity growth and exports. Some of these industries have the capacity to absorb large shares 
of Africa’s growing urban labour force. It is possible that these industries offer the potential for a 
new—or at least complementary—path towards structural transformation. 
As mentioned, the market should be the basic mechanism for resource allocation, but that governments 
in Africa and Asia (supported by donors such as DFID amongst other) must play an active role in 
coordinating investments for industrial upgrading and diversification. DFID policy does acknowledge 
                                                        
4 Rodrik, D. 2012. Unconditional Convergence in Manufacturing. Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (1): 165-205. 
5 Lea, N. 2019. Ethiopia's industrial baby and the macroeconomic bathwater. DFID Chief Economist's Office Country 
Note. London; DFID. 
6 McKinsey Global Institute. 2012. Manufacturing the future: The next era of global growth and innovation. 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/the-future-of-manufacturing 
7 Signé, L and Johnson, C. 2018. The potential of manufacturing and industrializsation in Africa Trends, opportunities, 
and strategies. Africa Growth Initiative. The Brookings Institute.   
8 Newfarmer, R., Page, J. & Tarp, F. 2018. Industries without Smokestacks and Structural Transformation in Africa: 
Overview. In "Industries without Smokestack - Industrialization in Africa Reconsidered”. UNU-Wider Studies in 
Development Economics. UK: Oxford University Press. 
9 See also: Dinh, Hinh T., Palmade, V., Chandra, V. & Cossar, F. 2012. Light Manufacturing in Africa - Targeted 
Policies to Enhance Private Investment and Create Jobs. Co-publication of the Agence Française de Développement 
and the World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/LightManufacturingInAfrica-FullReport.pdf 




the increasing importance of promoting manufacturing in developing countries in its economic 
development strategy11, and aims to develop and implement an effective and coherent portfolio of 
manufacturing support programmes. 
The overall objective of DFID’s efforts to promote industrialisation, in which stimulating 
manufacturing activities is the most essential element, is twofold:  
- To increase the importance of the manufacturing sector within the overall economies of countries 
in which DFID has a presence, increasing manufacturing productivity and the share that 
manufacturing contributes to GDP and thus, supporting structural transformation. This equally 
includes raising the share of employment in the manufacturing sector and the share of 
manufactured products as exports, among other outcomes. 
- To ensure that an expanding manufacturing sector has positive development impacts for society 
with regard to DFID’s broader inclusive development objectives, including poverty alleviation, 
job creation, labour rights, gender, equality, clean production, etc.   
The broader impacts of manufacturing are also greatly relevant to DFID’s overall human development 
agenda. Manufacturing creates jobs through direct, indirect and multiplier effects. It provides better 
quality jobs for both blue and white collar involved in medium to high technical content. 
Manufacturing implies the creation and transferability of skills and capabilities that are systemic, 
higher value and formal (e.g. technical managerial and quality management jobs). Manufacturing is 
highly connected to other key sectors, opening employment in those sectors (packaging and fertilizers 
for agribusiness, electronics equipment for telecoms, etc.).  Manufacturing has played a crucial role 
in job creation, by absorbing surplus labour from traditional sectors and directing it into higher-paying, 
formal activities.  
IMC Worldwide undertook a review of DFID’s global manufacturing support portfolio. The study 
includes an analysis of manufacturing support approaches of other donors and multilateral 
organisations (MOs) with a view to providing ideas and context for DFID to formulate future 
manufacturing support programmes. This concluding synthesis report proposes recommendations and 
suggests a way forward to operationalize DFID’s manufacturing promotion ambitions. This report is 
structured in two parts. Part A reviews manufacturing facts and trends on a global scale and discussed 
the emerging challenges. The further explore support and investment opportunities of various 
manufacturing subsectors in developing countries. Part B is moves into the operational consequences 
of developing manufacturing programme analysis of comparative advantage, product space and 
binding constraints. Further programme output and input in a logical framework. The last chapter 
discusses organisational implications in terms of DFID’s spending on manufacturing support and the 





                                                        




































1. Global trends in manufacturing  
 
1.1 Macro-economic landscape 
In the past decades, China emerged as the global factory of the world. However, the recent trend 
is the decline in the share of manufacturing in global GDP paralleled by a corresponding 
expansion in the share of services. A related recent trend is ongoing deindustrialization in almost 
all HICs including China. 
In the last two decades, there has been a distinct shift in the distribution of global manufacturing. High-
income countries’ global share of manufacturing value added has been declining while that of China 
has expanded consistently since the 1990s. While high-income countries (HICs) still hold the largest 
share of Manufacturing Value Added (MVA), their share has declined consistently due mostly to 
offshoring of production by their multinational firms, which either established export platforms in 
lower-cost locations or initiated production to serve the local markets (Figure 1).  
China, by far the largest winner of this trend, has emerged as the global factory of the world - its share 
of global MVA increased from under 5 percent in 1970 to 25 percent in 2015. The shares of a few 
other regions namely East Asia, South Asia and Eastern Europe in global MVA also increased but 
were concentrated at relatively low levels in a handful of emerging economies: India, Indonesia, the 
Republic of Korea, Poland, Thailand, and Turkey. China has also joined the HICs as a dominant player 
of manufactured exports.12  
Figure 1: Share of global manufacturing value added in China, global regions and high-income 
countries, 1994 - 2015 
 
Source: Hallward-Driemeier and Nayyar, 2017 
A second remarkable trend is the decline in the share of MVA in global GDP paralleled by an 
expansion in the corresponding share of services, which relates to the dominance of services in high 
income countries. From just under 20 percent in 1997, the share of MVA in global GDP shrank to 
                                                        
12 Hallward-Driemeier, M., Nayyar, G. 2017. Trouble in the Making? The Future of Manufacturing-Led 
Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/27946 
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under 15 percent by 2015 (Figure 2). This decrease was offset by rapid growth in the share of Services 
Value-Added (SAV) in global GDP, which increased from 62 to 69 percent during the same period. 
In real terms (constant 2010 prices), the manufacturing sector did not contract. Between 1997 and 
2015, the level of global MVA rose by 49 percent from US$7.8 trillion in 1997 to US$11.6 trillion in 
2015. 
A third trend is recorded in ongoing deindustrialization in almost all HICs including China. A large 
part of the contraction in the share of manufacturing in their domestic economies is attributable to the 
faster rise in the demand for services and a growing share of service inputs in manufacturing.13 In 
upper middle-income countries, the composition of production and exports is also changing and seems 
to mimic the “flying geese” paradigm, i.e., moving from labour-intensive to higher-skill manufactured 
goods except for China, which is a dominant player in both types of goods. Outside Asia, few lower 
middle-income countries display a revealed comparative advantage in anything but labour-intensive 
goods or commodity-based regional processing. Most are far from the global technology frontier.  
Figure 2: Global manufacturing share of GDP and absolute value relative to services, 1997-2015 
  
Source: Hallward-Driemeier and Nayyar, 2017 
Evidence of the peaking of manufacturing shares of both total value-added and employment at lower 
levels and at lower levels of per capita income than observed in the past have triggered concerns 
regarding “premature deindustrialization”. 14 In a sample of 42 countries between 1950 and 2012, the 
peak shares of manufacturing in value added and employment were both lower and occurred at lower 
levels of development than in the past.  Moreover, the process was more rapid in successive decades 
since the 1960s.15 While this stylized fact is generally acceptable, whether it is indeed “premature” is 
being debated primarily because many believe that the rapid ‘servicification’ of manufacturing or the 
increasing use of modern services such as computing and AI in the production of manufactured goods 
in recent decades have created some measurement challenges.  
 
                                                        
13 Ibid. 
14 Dasgupta, S. & Singh, A. 2006. Manufacturing, Services and Premature Deindustrialization in Developing 
Countries: A Kaldorian Analysis. WIDER Working Paper Series 049, World Institute for Development Economic 
Research (UNU-WIDER). 




1.2 Global Value Chains  
Manufacturing in global value chains (GVCs) breaks the production process into different steps 
that can be carried out in different countries. This creates opportunities for developing countries 
to enter manufacturing by producing components of larger goods. However, after significant 
growth, there are signs that the role of GVCs may now be diminishing.   
While manufacturing has historically played a pivotal role in industrialisation and the graduation of 
countries to a high-income status, in recent decades several developments are reshaping the global 
manufacturing landscape and calling into question its potential to serve the low- and lower middle-
income countries (LMICs) effectively. Typically, LMICs which specialise in labour- and commodity-
intensive manufactures have had an opportunity to reap the dynamic spill overs associated with 
international trade - scale, technology diffusion, and competition - with large-scale employment 
creation for unskilled workers. However, the recent emergence and stronghold of global value chains 
(GVCs) which break up the production process into different steps that can be carried out in different 
countries, is posing new challenges for the LMICs to expand their share of global manufacturing.  
Geography is a vital determinant in a LMIC’s ability to participate in a GVC of manufactured products 
as it facilitates trade in parts and components that is the quintessence of GVC trade. The world seems 
to have only three interconnected production hubs for extensive trade in parts and components - one 
centred on the United States, one on Asia (China, Japan, Republic of Korea), and one on Europe 
(especially Germany). The vast majority of the bilateral flows of parts and components occur between 
the countries in these hubs. Except for China, developing countries are generally on the periphery and 
tend to trade with the hub that is geographically closest. This is problematic as many developing 
regions, especially most African countries, are far from the hubs and are excluded from GVC trade. 
Moreover, within developing countries that do participate in a GVC, it is the large firms that tend to 
be involved. The lead firms in the HICs are usually the lead buyers with significant market power; 
they set the minimum entry bar through decisions about the technological standards and skills required 
to produce parts and components for assembly in the GVC. Two critical stumbling blocks for LMICs 
to participate in a GVC are distance from the global technological frontier and the sophistication of 
knowledge activities such as R&D and product design required in the early stages of production, or 
marketing, logistics, and after-product servicing required in later stages that are generally performed 
in the HICs where the mass consumption products are eventually purchased by households.  
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Source: World Bank 2017. 
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In the last decade, GVCs accounted for 60–67 percent of global trade in value-added terms (World 
Bank, 2017), raising concerns in both rich and poor countries. Rich-country electorates worry that 
manufacturing is being hollowed out and semiskilled production jobs have moved to developing 
countries or, to the extent that such jobs still remain in HICs, have suffered downward pressure on 
wages. Poor countries worry that they are trapped in low-value-added activities and are locked out of 
the higher value-added activities in design, key technological inputs, and marketing.  
Trade in intermediate goods contributed more than trade in final goods to the growth of total 
manufacturing trade in 2001–08 and 2009–14 and to its decline in 2000–01 and 2008–09 (World Bank 
2017). Trade in final goods contributed more to the growth of manufacturing trade during 1995–2000 
and to its recent decline in 2014–15. The weight of intraregional exports in trade in intermediate and 
final manufactured goods over 1995–2015 for Europe, the Americas, Asia, and the rest of the world 
highlights the large shares of intraregional linkages among them and confirms that GVCs are organised 
mainly at the regional level.16 Table 1 shows that European industrial inputs originate essentially from 
European supply chains. While the shares are not as high, the share of intra-American trade in total 
intermediate goods trade gradually increased sharply between 1995 and 2015. While the shares of 
manufacturing inputs in trade within both North and South America are relatively low, those between 
North America and South America are higher. The two-way intra-Asia trade in intermediate goods 
was almost as high as Europe.  
Historically, LMICs have tended to export unprocessed raw materials but GVCs offer an opportunity 
to trade in manufactures and diversify their exports in variety and value-addition. GVC might also 
provide benefits to developing countries by enabling them to produce components in larger 
manufactured goods. However, a challenge for LMIC policymakers is to find productive ways to 
facilitate the entry of LMICs in GVCs, if they want jobs and productivity increases. A serious present 
limitation is the low technology and skills in the lowest income countries, which hampers the 
integration in high-value product or component GVCs on the short run.17 
A recent report of the economist (July 2019) finds that the GVCs in 16 of 17 big industries it studied 
have been contracting since the global financial crisis. Exports in those same value chains declined 
from 28.1% to 22.5% of gross output between 2007 and 2017.18 The importance of GVCs in 
production seems to be stalling. The biggest declines in trade intensity were observed in the most 
heavily traded and complex GVCs, such as those in clothing, cars and electronics.  
A closer look into these recent trends in GVCs and globalisation shows patterns of regionalisation 
suggesting that more production is happening in markets that are closer to major consumers19. MNCs 
are reducing reliance on GVCs due to a reappraisal of risk (including political) and the growing 
importance of services within manufacturing (which, for example, encourages reshoring to be more 
attuned to local consumer needs). Transnational corporations are clearly rethinking the linear sourcing 
model for Western markets, but the path forward is unclear. Different industries in different 
manufacturing sub-sectors will make different choices. 
                                                        
16 World Bank 2017, Baldwin and Lopez, 2013 
17 Suggested by EGAT in commentary on the earlier version of the working document.  





1.3 Emerging challenges – Industry 4.0  
Automation is happening. There is uncertainty over the precise impact and timing. However, 
the most important manufacturing sub-sectors located in developing countries are unlikely to 
be adversely affected in the short term. 
Another salient development in modern manufacturing is Industry 4.0 or the profusion of modern 
process technologies associated with the new production paradigm powered by robotics, AI, the 
Internet of Things, and 3-D printing. Industry 4.0 seems to be disrupting traditional manufacturing 
patterns by pushing manufacturing in the HICs closer to labour-saving technologies which seem 
unlikely to help the LMICs in expanding their share in global manufacturing. An ongoing debate is 
centred on the feasibility of manufacturing-led development in LMICs that have a competitive 
advantage in cheap labour and still use traditional manufacturing technologies and compete on price.  
The speculation is that 
production processes based on 
Industry 4.0 in high-income 
countries will be able to 
deliver higher and better 
quality at lower unit prices, 
eliminating manufacturing 
jobs in the LMICs. Recent 
evidence however suggests 
that these concerns are 




Although some studies estimate that half or more of current occupations across all sectors could be 
automated away by new technologies other studies show that only 6 – 12 percent of current jobs are 
at high risk of automation in the OECD. 20 Others find that the threat of automation to jobs is relatively 
modest, at 2–8 percent for LMICs.21  
The manufacturing sector is increasingly relying on services, whether as inputs, as activities within 
firms or as output sold bundled with goods. This “servicification” fundamentally changes the nature 
of the manufacturing sector.22 Most of the service inputs require technically skilled and tech savvy 
workers which are in short supply. Evidently, from 1995 to 2011 the share of service inputs in the total 
production value of manufactures increased by about 6 percentage points, on average, across 
countries. For the median economy in the sample, the contribution of services to gross manufacturing 
output was about one-third of manufacturing gross output in 2011 but the range was wide stretching 
from about 15 percent in Indonesia to 50 percent in France and 70 percent in Luxembourg. To the 
extent that this increase in the services component of manufacturing reflects consumers’ preference 
for more service-intensive inputs such as sophisticated design, computing and software, or assembling 
production inputs that are increasingly diffused geographically and therefore require world-class 
logistics and communications skills, the paucity of skills in the LMICs will be a disadvantage (IMF, 
WEO April 2018).    
                                                        
20 Bowles 2014; Frey and Osborne 2013; Manyika 2016; World Bank 2016), Arntz, Gregory, and Zierahn, 2016) 
21 Ahmed and Chen 2017. 
22 Hallward-Driemeier, M., Nayyar, G. 2017. Trouble in the Making? The Future of Manufacturing-Led 
Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/27946 
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Both in the academic world and among development practitioners there is much debate about the role 
of manufacturing and the future prospects for low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) in Asia and 
Africa. Trends are flagged such as premature de-industrialisation in Africa and the implications of 
Industry 4.0 and labour-saving technologies on manufacturing.23 These trends seem likely to hinder 
LMICs in expanding their manufacturing base as well as their share of global manufacturing 
production. Consequently, it is not expected that the manufacturing sector will offer as much labour-
intensive work in the long run as it previously did in advanced economies.  
While it is true that the emergence of phenomena such as servicification and Industry 4.0 are a 
challenge for LMICs in becoming or remaining competitive locations for manufacturing, there are at 
least two stylised facts that suggest job creation by industrialisation on the short run. First, in the 
medium to longer term, changes at the intersection of technology and globalisation will remain the 
most relevant forces shaping the geography of manufacturing production. To compete, LMICs will 
need a workforce with a large share of high- and medium-skill, tech savvy workers who are adept at 
keeping up with global technological know-how and have the flexibility to adapt and innovate. While 
few LMICs are presently well positioned to take on this challenge, Chinese policymakers have 
demonstrated that among other things, these parameters can be changed with appropriate and timely 
reforms and investments in human capital and technology.  
Secondly, closing the gap with the global labour productivity frontier is easier in manufacturing than 
other sectors of a LMIC and can be strategic in transitioning to a high-income status. In a sample of 
130 economies, Rodrik (2013, 2016) provides solid evidence to demonstrate that labour productivity 
in manufacturing has tended to converge to the frontier, regardless of policies, institutions, and other 
country characteristics (unconditional convergence), whereas labour productivity for the overall 
economy (and hence the nonmanufacturing sector) has not. This unique attribute implies that a 
growing manufacturing sector can play a fundamental role in the catch-up of the LMICs with the 
advanced economy per capita income levels. McMillan and Rodrik (2011) provide further validation 
by showing that structural transformation between 1990 and 2005 tended to be growth-reducing in 
developing countries that did not experience increases in the share of manufacturing employment. 
In conclusion, most of the challenges are more relevant for upper middle-income countries and not for 
low income and lower middle-income countries. The most important manufacturing sub-sectors 
located in those countries are unlikely to be adversely affected in the short term. In any case, a 
successful African economy of the twenty-first century is unlikely to look like the successful East 
Asian economy of the twentieth. It will be more diverse and draw on a broader range of highly 
productive economic activities for sustained growth.  
  
                                                        
23 Rodrik, Dani. 2016. “Premature Deindustrialization.” Journal of Economic Growth 21: 1–33. 
17 
 
2. Manufacturing subsectors in developing countries  
 
Different subsectors require different factor/input intensities, output markets, infrastructure 
requirements and have short and long development prospects. Focusing on priority 
manufacturing subsectors in support programmes is an effective approach applied by leading 
donors and MOs. Below is an overview of trends in some key manufacturing sub-sectors of 
particular significance to developing countries and a summary of their requirements and 
impacts on a host country. 
Although the manufacturing sector is often discussed as one sector in theory and policy and 
programme practice, in reality the sector is a heterogeneous collection of subsectors with differences 
in terms of products, technology and requirements as well as growth opportunities and societal 
impacts.24 This chapter explores key selected manufacturing subsectors in developing countries and 
reviews the different features in terms of inputs (capital, labour, local natural resources, 
technology/R&D), markets (domestic, export) and economic value creation and longer term societal 
(development) impact and investment attractiveness.  
  
2.1 Selected manufacturing subsectors 
Textiles and garment 
Since the mid-1980s, textile and garment global value chains (buyer-driven) managed by branded 
manufacturers from the advanced countries have channelled exports mainly from developing 
economies to markets in the EU, the U.S. and Japan. It is a sector where relatively modern technology 
can be adopted even in poor countries at relatively low investment costs. These technological features 
of the industry have made it suitable as the first rank on the industrialisation ladder in poor countries, 
some of which have experienced a very high output growth rate in the sector (e.g. Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka, Viet Nam and Mauritius).25  
The garments subsector has been a low-tech, unskilled labour-intensive activity, surviving on cheap 
predominantly female labour. There have been significant human rights issues in the garment industry 
(the collapse of the Rana Plaza in 2013 was a turning point toward more seriously observing labour 
conditions in the subsector). The industry is undergoing a technological renaissance and the more 
competitive firms will be those that harness new design production and IT technologies and match 
these with a more skilled workforce. The leading top tier forms are already moving in this direction 
but for the rest, a change is required in hiring, compensation and in-house training practices.26  
Textile and garment imports from China and Indonesia have been declining due to the rising cost of 
labour. Many African countries are striving to move up the global value chain in the footsteps of 
countries like China and (more recently) Bangladesh. Several African countries, like Uganda and 
Tanzania, have an inherent advantage because they are major cotton suppliers.27 The global value 
chains are also changing because of the ending of the several trade agreements (Multi Fibre 
                                                        
24 Boomgard, J., Davies, S., Haggblade,  S. & Mead, D. 1992. A subsector approach to small enterprise promotion 
and research. World Development 20(2): 199-212. 
25 Quarcoo, R., Modesta, E., Gavor, D. & Tetteh-Coffie. 2012. Challenges Facing Garment Producing Industries 
under AGOA in Ghana. International Journal of Clothing Science. 2(1): 9-14. doi:10.5923/j.clothing.20130201.02 
26 Yusuf, S. 2012. Garment Suppliers Beware - The global garments value chain is changing. Working paper 





Agreement), slowing growth in the advanced countries, rising South-South trade, shifts in consumer 
demand and technological advances on several fronts.  
Automation in some instances transforms the workshops in Bangladesh and brings production back to 
western countries. Technology is becoming more advanced and machines can increasingly handle 
difficult tasks such as manipulating pliable fabrics, stitching pockets and attaching belt loops to pants. 
A 2016 ILO study predicted some Asian nations could lose more than 80% of their garment, textile 
and apparel manufacturing jobs as automation spreads. As such, the number of new jobs added by the 
garment and textile trades has fallen to 60,000 a year, from over 300,000 annually between 2003 and 
2010, according to World Bank data.28 
Case 1: Textile and garment company – Kikoy beach towels in Kenya29   
 
The Kikoy beach towel company in Nairobi was established in 2010 by a Kenyan entrepreneur who saw attractive 
business opportunities in the subsector. He started his business without sewing machines employing 10 people. The 
owner received information about a newly constructed ‘Export Processing Zone (EPZ)’ in Nairobi and moved to the 
site in 2012. At the EPZ, the company grew rapidly and specialised in producing their main product: Kikoy beach 
towels. At present, the company has 26 sewing machines employing 70 skilled people. The company exports to Europe 
(Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain, France, The Netherlands and the UK) and to Japan.  
 
The EPZ provides tax incentives (no corporate tax for 10 years, 
export and VAT tax holidays amongst others) and provides 
infrastructure and facilitation in export procedures, logistics and 
acquisitions. The owner feels that the EPZ is a good location, much 
more efficient in regard to export procedures and paperwork. Before 
the company entered the EPZ, they had to take their products to the 
airport, and complete the documentation and procedures by 
themselves. It usually took a week before the products could actually 
be shipped. Now, thanks to the efficient customs office at the EPZ, 
if the product is finished by 3 pm, then by 6 pm it is at the airport 
with the procedures completed and ready to go.  
 
 
The owner makes serious efforts to retain his trained staff in times of less orders, because getting skilled labourers back 
is a problem. Hiring new staff and training them to stitch the expected quality takes 2 to 3 months. The owner does not 
want to lose staff because they have unique skills – “it’s not everyone who can do this”.  
 
Food and beverages 
The food system contributes a significant share of jobs in developing countries. Apart from just 
primary agricultural production, the sector includes food storage, manufacturing and processing, 
distribution, transport, associated logistics, retailing and other services. In many countries, the off-
farm aspect of the food system accounts for a large share of the economy’s manufacturing and services 
sectors. In Malawi and Tanzania, for example, food and beverages account for more than 40 percent 
of total manufacturing employment. 30 While the employment share in farming tends to decline as per 
capita incomes rise, the share in food manufacturing and services increases. In low-income countries, 
farming tends to dominate employment in the food system. As countries grow, manufacturing 
accounts for a much larger share of job creations, to 25% in Brazil for instance.31  
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Food and beverages processing are a significant driver of local economies, creating supplier linkages 
for small-scale farmers and helping elevate rural incomes across Africa and Asia. However, small and 
growing local processors often have difficulties producing high-quality affordable and nutritious 
products that meet food safety standards and regulatory requirements due to a lack of technical and 
business knowledge and investment. Moreover, the industry requires high capital investment and quality 
inputs from the value chain, which are sometimes difficult to obtain. 
Case 2: Soya beverages and cakes company in Uganda32 
 
The owner of the soya beverage company in Kampala started producing and selling food with simple traditional oven. 
His business, informal at first, grew slowly then experimented with new products. Today established as a formal 
business with 40 employees, the company produces several key products including Soya Cup, a drinking product that 
tastes like coffee. The owner realised that soya is by far the most nutritious product available in Uganda. Moreover, 
Uganda is one of the top 4 major soya producers in Africa. Unfortunately, the supply of locally produced soya is not 
always reliable in terms of quality and volume. The owner is not happy with the fact that 50% raw beans are exported 
from Uganda – “we are not only exporting beans cheaply but also exporting jobs.”  
 
The company targets the Ugandan domestic market, selling directly 
to supermarkets, retailers, some schools, a few NGOs, and also 
individual customers via a small company shop. In terms of 
marketing, the products are advertised on radio and TV. He sees the 
necessity for Uganda to add value to the country and export finished 
products – “the industrialisation of this country is the way to go for 
us to get real value from our agricultural production.” The owner 
mentions that his focus on and persistence in business is a key 
success factor. Although his formal education is limited to primary 
school level, he has trained himself by attending short courses 
networking with food experts.   
 
The owner feels the business environment is politically acceptable, although the government lacks the means and 
capacity to provide direct support to his business. He borrowed from money lenders – “these guys used to charge 20% 
per month.” He feels the high taxes are unacceptable – “the taxes are killers.” The Ugandan Small-Scale Industries 
Association offered him several useful business development services, including courses on how to bring products to 
market, marketing and financial management.  
 
The growth of the food and beverages industry is propelled mainly by developing countries such as 
India, China, and Brazil, as the economies of these nations improve and more people are lifted into 
the middle class.33 In Africa and Asia, the food and beverages sector increased faster than the average 
of other manufacturing sub-sectors, partly because of the importance of growing domestic demand.34 
Urbanisation and population growth are expected to aid this consumer spend. As disposable income 
rises, consumer expenditure on food and beverages in Africa and Asia will increase from 53% of 
global expenditure in 2017 to 60% by 2030. 35 Reflecting Africa’s growing population and rising 
household incomes, manufacturing of regional processing goods such as food and beverages is a 
second major opportunity according to McKinsey Global Institute.36 
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Still, Africa imports about a third of its processed food and drink, a far higher share than developing 
Asia or Latin America. Thus, the scope for food and beverages import substitution is clear; much more 
of that could be made locally.37 At the same time, the Africa-EU - international trade statistics suggest 
that there are export opportunities beyond the regions as well. Between 2007 and 2017 the share of 
food and beverages exports from Africa to the EU rose substantially from 10% to around 15%38.  
The observed food production and consumption trends highlight the importance of pursuing a 
substantial transformation of the food system in Sub Sahara Africa and Asia if incomes are to be risen 
and food security problems are to be mitigated. Agriculture and related manufacturing are marked by 
low productivity with little application of science and technology. Improvements in productivity 
require innovations in technology and adoption and application of these technologies.39 
Pharmaceuticals  
The McKinsey Global Institute40 suggests that there is a substantial opportunity for pharmaceutical 
companies in local production, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, through public, private and mixed 
partnerships, or regional initiatives for licensing of production in an effort to improve access to 
affordable medicines. Local production can reduce the dependency on global donations and the 
shrinking number of foreign companies who dominate the global market. 
Proponents of local production, including activist organisations such as Médecins Sans Frontières and 
organisations within the United Nations (UN), argue that local production of pharmaceuticals would 
decrease transport costs, provide local jobs, improve local expertise, and cut dependence on foreign 
suppliers. Many leaders in developing countries in Africa and Asia appear to believe it will also help 
their nations in achieving economic autonomy and sustainable development. The African Union has 
previously highlighted the need to “formulate a plan of action to facilitate increased drug 
manufacturing in the region and to bolster research and development (R&D).” 41 
However, in some instances today, local manufacturers in developing countries have shown 
insufficient regard for industry-standard best-practices. With little or no local regulatory control, 
substandard drugs are manufactured and distributed widely. Such low-quality drugs pose an 
immediate threat to public health and a potentially more serious challenge to the long-term viability 
of many first-line drugs by encouraging drug-resistant strains of pathogens. Most manufacturers in 
developing countries operate without much regard for international standards and experts stress the 
need for regulatory standards.42 
Since 2006, UNIDO has provided technical cooperation and advisory services to advance local 
pharmaceutical production in developing countries with a wide range of public and private sector 
partners. Under a global project, UNIDO contributed to improving the operational environment and 
technical capacities of local manufacturers and helped in “mainstreaming” local pharmaceutical 
production as a global development theme. In May 2018, UNIDO and the West African Health 
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Organization (WAHO) agreed to collaborate and support the development of the pharmaceutical 
industry across the ECOWAS region. 
Leather and footwear 
The global leather value chain is a complex system of animal husbandry, industrial and assembly 
processes and branded marketing, with semi-finished and finished products being sold and exported 
between companies and countries. One peculiarity of this value chain is its dependence on another 
value chain, animal production. Essentially, the leather industry is built on meat production 
worldwide. Human skills, equipment and chemicals are needed for the production of top quality 
leather.  
For footwear and leather garments and goods sectors, additional attributes are required like high 
manufacturing skills, design know-how, computer-aided design systems, branding and marketing. 
Environmental policy with respect to process standards, economic and eco-labelling schemes have 
received more attention in the recent past and although these measures are intended to protect the 
environment, support trade and reduce unfair competition, they might at first increase the scale of the 
burden in many developing countries due to the lack of financial and managerial skills  that are 
required for successful implementation and monitoring of these standards. Trade barriers still exist in 
both EU and the US. Growth and upgrading are real possibilities for firms in the global leather value 
chain. China's development to the leading footwear supplier to the United States and the EU in 25 
years is an example of this. This paper provides policy recommendations for developing and less 
developed countries, and for international organisations.43 
The current predictions are that the supply of leather raw material will continue to grow in line with 
population growth, but trends that indicate higher costs of production and a decreasing availability of 
land for raising cattle and for growing grains to feed the cattle, as well as an increase in pork and 
poultry consumption in Asia and Africa, are now becoming apparent.44 Leather raw materials have 
increasingly become available in the developing world, while in the developed countries, a declining 
per capita consumption of red meat has reduced the supply of hides and skins. Now, more than half of 
the world’s supply of leather raw material comes from the developing world and, increasingly, those 
countries with large supplies are seeking to add value through processing them through to finished 
leather goods. 
Historically, the tanning industry was characterised by small or medium-size family businesses. The 
trend has been for the manufacture of leather products to move to where labour is cheapest, and for 
tanneries to follow. Very often, the countries with the fastest growing leather industries – such as the 
Republic of Korea, Taiwan, China, Indonesia and Viet Nam – have been hindered by shortcomings in 
raw material supply and had to import large quantities of hides and skins. Now, new tanneries are 
being set up in these countries in order to meet the growing demand for leather, while most tanners in 
Europe, Japan and the USA have closed down their facilities. This trend seems likely to continue. 
China has been, by far, the most significant player in all sectors of the leather industry in recent years. 
The country now dominates every category of manufacturing by a considerable margin. Lately, China 
has recognised that it has allowed development of this industry without proper environmental 
safeguards, and it is now starting to take corrective action. It has also reduced its support for footwear 
manufacturing since it is substituting production for higher value products.  This does not mean that 
China’s dominance of the industry will end. It is expected that the Chinese industry will continue to 
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grow, but at a slower pace and in a different way. More of its output of leather products, in particular 
footwear, will be used to meet domestic demand rather than to export. In addition to these changes, 
increased costs in China- particularly in the rising wage rates, have already created new opportunities 
for further development of the industry in Viet Nam, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and India. No country 
has the size or capability to replace China as industry leader, but these shifts have given a boost to 
many other aspiring nations.45 
Case 3: Leather processing – leather bags and handicrafts in Ethiopia46 
 
The leather products company is located in Addis Ababa and produces a range of bags, cases, tourist items, corporate 
gifts and other handicrafts. The products are mostly shipped to the US, Germany and China, with only a small 
proportion sold in Ethiopia. The company has 18 permanent workers and often many more temporary staff, up to 
100 depending on the volume of orders. The designer/production manager designs leather backpacks and laptop 
bags himself – “You can do a lot of design with leather.” The company has stitching machines from Germany and 
China, the latter requiring “maintenance every day.” The company has a spacious workshop, which they acquired 
five years ago through a government programme, launched in 2010, to support small businesses by providing land 
on long-term leases.  
 
The business environment has not been easy but has provided 
many opportunities. The company faces increasing competition 
– “The competitors buy design items here and copy them.” The 
input material is bought in Ethiopia, mostly leather from young 
goats. The goat meat is exported abroad but the leather remains 
in Ethiopia for leather product manufacturing, and other uses. 
The designer invests a lot of time in searching for the best leather. 
The quality improves if chemicals are used, but at the moment, 
the dollar rate is high, so fewer imported chemicals are available 




The company imports the accessories directly, which is problematic due to limited access to foreign currency. 
Moreover, the government regulates imports and tells companies where to buy their input materials. For instance, 
the company has to buy zippers from China, “which is based on a political agenda, but the quality is not good.” The 
production volume, turnover and profit are still growing every year – “The past year was good, this year is even 




The dream of a viable, full-blown national automotive industry lies beyond the reach of all but the 
very largest developing countries, and even in these countries it seems inevitable that multinational 
firms will continue to dominate the domestic industry for a long time to come.47  
But there are several other avenues open for development. A few midsize developing countries, such 
as South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey, are large and rich enough to support vehicle assembly for their 
domestic markets as long as they can export to their wider regions as well. Several developing 
countries are close enough to developed countries to supply parts on a just-in-time basis within 
regional trade blocs. These countries have become export hubs for labour-intensive parts and more 
recently for low-cost vehicles as well. A nascent possibility is for local automakers to leverage the 
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new, relatively open global supply base to rapidly become more competitive locally and, perhaps, in 
world markets. 
As the markets for motor vehicles shift to the developing world and production inevitably follows, 
more development and design work will shift as well. In India domestic firms have deeper engineering 
capabilities, and the small, bare-bones vehicles that dominate the local market comprise a segment 
that has eluded most multinational firms so far. It remains to be seen whether these vehicles can be 
successfully exported. The prospects for local companies in automotive global value chains are still 
less promising than in other industries, but the future could eventually become significantly bright. 
At the same time, the Economist (July 2019) signals a recent trend towards greater regionalisation and 
suggests more automobile production will occur in proximity to major consumer markets. The car 
industry seems to concentrate and merge around three regional hub-and-spoke networks: Mexico as 
the low-cost spoke for America; Eastern Europe and Morocco for Western Europe; and South-East 
Asia and China for Asia.48 
 
Case 4: Automotive – truck chassis in South Africa49 
  
The truck manufacturing company is located in Pretoria and assembles tailor-made trucks from the frame, engine 
and chassis parts, supplied by the original equipment manufacturers. The company specialises in tipper, dropside 
and flat deck truck bodies as well as water and vacuum/sewage tankers. The company employs 55 people at present. 
 
The company was established 19 years ago by a South African involved in the truck body building business. The 
company does not do a lot of advertisement and it has never had a sales representative or marketing manager – “we 
have been very lucky so far that we get sufficient requests for quotes followed by actual orders.” Recently, the 
company has received orders from different dealers in neighbouring countries. In fact, the company just started to 
export in the region– “export is very small at this stage, but there is so much potential for our company.” 
 
The company engages low-skilled workers with basic skills 
– “as long as they have some expertise and experience and 
they are willing to learn, then we take them on board.” 
Higher qualified and experienced staff expect a certain salary 
and “unfortunately as a company and in our industry, we 
cannot afford those salaries.” At the same time, the owner 
sees a lot of business opportunities for his company on the 
African continent. The manager is not positive about the 
institutional context. He believes that South Africa is one of 
the most highly regulated countries in the world for running 
specifically in regards filling out forms, Black Economic 
Empowerment regulations and labour unions. 
 
 
The manager sees that labour unions have gained a power base in South Africa in the past 20 years. The manager 
expects strikes within the company in the near future – “if you have a business in South Africa and most of your 
work force is part of a union, then you can expect a strike at least every second year.” The strikes mostly concern 
salary, safety issues and working conditions. Moreover, the manager sees that South Africa has entered a stage 
where business is fuelling corruption “because to get something done you need to pay somebody. It’s becoming a 
culture.”  
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2.2 Development features of selected manufacturing subsectors 
The manufacturing subsectors described above, and others, present development opportunities to 
various degrees while implying several contextual requirements. Table 2 summarises the main features 
(‘stylized facts’) in this respect50 and compares development prospects and support implications for 
manufacturing subsectors in developing countries. The table could serve as an initial reference point 
to reflect on subsectors to target in a given country and assess to what extent a subsector matches the 
local opportunity.  
Specifically, the table assesses in column 1 - 4 the intensity of the production factors (input) of each 
sector in terms of capital, labour, technology and to what extent local natural resources are available 
and could be used for production. In column 5 - 6 the need for well-developed local transport and 
energy infrastructure is presented. Columns 7 – 8 list the target market of the subsector, either domestic 
or export via global value chains. Lastly, the table assesses the immediate economic value that is 
created, which refers to either an increase in quantitative terms of GDP and/or employment in the 
subsector. 
                                                        
50 The summary analysis is based on the team’s literature review of key manufacturing subsectors. 
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Textiles/garment51  + ++ + + + + - ++ ++ 
Food and 
beverages 
+ ++ + ++ + + ++ + ++ 
Pharmaceuticals + + ++ + + + ++ - ++ 
Automotive52  ++ + ++ - ++ ++ ++ - ++ 
Wood and 
furniture  
- ++ - ++ + ++ + + + 
Paper and pulp + - + + ++ ++ ++ + - 
Leather/footwear + ++ + ++ + + + ++ + 
Basic metal and 
metal products 
+ - + + ++ ++ ++ + + 
Chemicals  ++ - + + ++ ++ ++ - ++ 
Machinery and 
equipment 
++ + + - ++ ++ ++ - + 
Printing/publishing + - - - + - + - - 
Petroleum refining ++ - ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ + 
Construction / 
cement 
++ - + ++ ++ ++ ++ - ++ 
Electronics and 
precision equip.53 
+ ++ ++ - - + ++ + + 
 
 
         
 
Legend: ++ : High intensity/significance + : Medium intensity/significance - : No or very little intensity/significance 
                                                        
51 It is worth noting that establishing a textiles producing firm typically involves a capital expenditure of $100m to 300m, while a garment (cut and trim) firm involves a capex of 
$15m to 20m. Textiles are sticky attractive investments that require high R&D. Garments on the other hand have a high logistics needs for speed to markets. 
52 There is a difference in Completely knocked Down (CKD) assembly (low capital investment, low value added, complex logistics arrangements from original manufacturer of full 
end products involving high capital investments). This applies for ‘Machinery and equipment’ as well.  
53 McKinsey (2016) estimates that there are limited opportunities for manufacturing global technologies in developing countries (computers and office machinery; electronics, 




2.3 Investment opportunities in manufacturing subsectors   
For several subsectors, manufacturing is relatively capital-intensive and through FDI can 
generate some particular benefits in terms of job quality and technology spill overs. Industrial 
development banks (IDBs) can play a central role by promoting technological change. Different 
types of investment are attracted to countries with different characteristics and will have 
different impacts on the host country - these differences are summarised below. Market-seeking 
investments might generate local employment, but less international trade, whereas efficiency-
seeking investments might lead to both more employment and more international trade. 
Upgrading the industrial structure in a given country requires the upgrading of the factor endowment 
structure from one that is relatively abundant in labour and natural resources to one that is relatively 
abundant in capital, the introduction of new technologies, and the corresponding improvement in 
infrastructure to facilitate economic operations.54 Manufacturing is thus a capital-intensive sector.55 
The WB states that both domestic investment and foreign direct investment (FDI), can be strong 
complements.56 It is not a question whether to give priority to domestic or foreign investment for 
manufacturing promotion, rather to figure out what can be done make the two forms of investment 
work together.  
There are some particular benefits of FDI that should be mentioned, however. Domestic investments 
create jobs in a host economy – usually many more than FDI.57 Although foreign firms might not 
create as many jobs as the domestic private sector, but they often create better-paid jobs that require 
higher skills, which helps elevate the skills level in host economies. More advanced technologies and 
managerial or marketing practices can be introduced in a developing economy through FDI, and at a 
much faster rate than would be the case if only domestic investment were allowed. Moreover, through 
partnerships with foreign investors who have existing distribution channels and commercial 
arrangements around the world, developing countries’ firms can benefit from increased market access.  
In sum, FDI can help a developing country acquire an industrial base and achieve export 
competitiveness much faster than the “infant industry” policies with which many countries have 
experimented (e.g., import substitution, forced joint ventures, etc.). FDI can accelerate the “catching 
up” process of a developing economy and facilitate its integration within RVCs and GVCs.58 In sum, 
FDI remains a core ingredient for development of manufacturing in African and Asian LMICs. In 
2017, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that FDI flows 
to developing economies remained stable at $671 billion, seeing no recovery following a 10% drop in 
2016. However, FDI flows to Africa continued to slide, reaching $42 billion, down 21% from 2016. 
Flows to developing countries in Asia remained stable, at $476 billion. Against this background, there 
is an opportunity to promote FDI.59  
Capital accumulation programmes are typically (trust) funds, credit programmes, matching grants and 
guarantees, linked with other donors and multilateral organisations such as the World Bank. Support 
programmes could include various types of financial support components: 
                                                        
54 EGAT/DFID policy note in Zimbabwe. 2018. Zimbabwe: Possibilities for Manufactured Exports. 
55 Adam Szirmai, A. (2009) Is Manufacturing Still the Main Engine of Growth in Developing Countries? WIDER 




59 UNCTAD. 2018. World Investment Report 2018. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
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- Direct investment (venture capital) in manufacturing enterprises. This could be realised by 
establishing special funds for manufacturing development (e.g. a challenge fund, trust fund, 
competitiveness facility, etc.), stimulating and facilitating domestic investors, and attracting FDI.  
 
- Financial deepening to increase the provision of financial services by the finance industry, which 
encompasses a broad range of businesses that manage money. Such businesses include credit 
unions, banks, credit card companies, insurance companies, accountancy companies, consumer-
finance companies, stock brokerages and investment funds. 
 
- Patient capital investment in infrastructure by private investors such as pension funds.  
Many governments adopted manufacturing promotion strategies in which industrial development 
banks (IDB) play a central role in promoting the process of industrial development. IDBs are 
specialized Development Banks (DBs) operating in multiple economic sectors and market niches (e.g., 
agriculture, infrastructure, international trade, housing, tourism, energy), and their ability to reach 
customers in sectors that private financial institutions do not serve sufficiently makes them a relevant 
actor in the global development agenda.60 The world’s largest development banks include China 
Development Bank, Brazil Development Bank (BNDES), and Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW) 
in Germany. The CDC Group is the largest UK development bank and is also partly funded by DFID. 
In terms of assets, they are larger than the World Bank. But they are not the only ones, a recent World 
Bank survey included information on some 90 development banks in countries around the world.61 In 
annex B a case of the development bank in Ethiopia is presented. 
More specifically, IDBs are the financial arms of the state, channelling domestic savings towards 
medium- and long-term industrial projects. IDBs typically influence and promote technological 
change and assist in building a base for new modern technologies. By facilitating access to capital, 
they foster structural change. A UNIDO study (2015) reveals that industrial development banks fill a 
gap in the domestic financial market in which they operate by providing patient capital for long-term 
industrial projects and favourable conditions that make investments more attractive.62 Average 
maturities of loans from development banks are usually higher than those of other banks. Interest rates 
are also lower than those of other banks.  
The CDC Group provides development finance (budget £750 million) with a limited focus on 
manufacturing; only 7% of the finance is allocated for industrial development and manufacturing 
projects. Within DFID’s ambitions to support economic transformation, it would be logical that DFID 
supports the establishment of specialised IDBs emphasising the development of manufacturing 
subsectors in developing countries.  Such support will be most efficient and effective if it is embedded 
in the framework suggested in Table 4 and Table 6 below.   
 
                                                        
60 The use of the term ‘development banks’ is not universal. In some jurisdictions, such as China and Vietnam, DBs 
are known as policy banks. In Malaysia, they are called ‘development financial institutions’ (DFIs). In Latin 
America, they are referred to as public banks or DBs. 
61 Te Velde, D.W. 2014. Note on Development Banks. Annex 2 in The Future of UK Development cooperation: 
Phase 1 - Development Finance. London: House of Commons HC 334. 
62 Guadagno, F. 2016. The role of industrial development banking in spurring structural change. United Nations 




Subsectors and investment attraction 
Countries and their manufacturing subsectors differ in their attraction to investments, FDI.63 Okafr et 
al (2015) describe four locational motives of investment in developing countries.64 The different 
motives have different implication for donor support and for growth and development impact. 
There are countries that are unattractive to manufacturing investments due to small stagnant markets, 
fragility and conflict. Countries are considered too unstable for long-term substantial investment in 
manufacturing. Examples of such countries are Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, 
Syria, Palestine OPTs and Yemen. 
There are other countries that are attractive for natural resource-seeking manufacturing investments. 
Investors are interested in accessing and exploiting natural resources. For example, FDI is used for 
acquiring particular types of natural resources that are not available in their home country, like rich 
raw materials from extraction industries in Nigeria, Zambia, Ghana and Rwanda.65  
Market-seeking manufacturing investments are targeted at serving domestic or regional markets. 
International brands produce locally for local markets by adapting goods to local needs or tastes and 
to save the cost of serving a market from a distance. McKinsey estimates that three-quarters of the 
growth in potential manufacturing output would come from meeting intra-African demand and 
substituting imports of manufactured goods. 66 Examples of attractive countries for market-seeking 
manufacturing investment countries are DR Congo, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone.  
Efficiency-seeking investments seek to benefit from factors that enable it to compete in international 
markets. This type of investment takes advantage of differences in the availability and costs of 
traditional factor endowments as well as of economies of scale and supply capabilities. Examples of 
such economies include Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Jordan, Lebanon and Vietnam. 
In it important to note that that one country may be attractive for market-seeking investment in one 
subsector, while attractive for efficiency investments in other subsectors. Countries that are attractive 
for combined market- and efficiency-seeking are India, Indonesia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Myanmar, 
Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia. Table 3 presents an assessment of the viability of subsectors in the 
country type categories with regard to investment attraction.  
Investment attraction and development impact priority  
Development impact is different for each attraction motive. Morrisey (2012) argues that the extractive 
sector has a lesser impact on economic growth than manufacturing related FDI.67 This is despite the 
                                                        
63 Dunning, J. (1973), The Determinants of International Production, Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, Vol. 25, 
No. 3 (Nov. 1973), pp.289-336 
64 Okafor, G., Piesse, J. and Webster, A. 2015. The motives for inward FDI into Sub-Saharan African countries.  
Journal of Policy Modelling 37(5): 875-890. 
65 UNCTAD. 2007. World Investment Report 2007: Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and 
Development. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
https://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2007p2_en.pdf 
66 McKinsey Global Institute. 2016. Lions on the move ii: realizing the potential of Africa’s economies. 
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/middle-east-and-africa/lions-on-the-move-realizing-the-potential-of-
africas-economies 
67 Morrisey. O. 2012. FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Few Linkages, Fewer spill overs. European Journal of 
Development Research 24: 26–31. 
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extractive sector FDI being one of the largest and fastest growing forms of investment in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Efficiency-seeking FDI is particularly important for countries looking to integrate into the global 
economy and move up the value chain. Efficiency-seeking FDI is not only export-oriented, but also 
key to export diversification. Nonetheless, the choice of sub-sectors is important for determining the 
impact of FDI and the potential for successfully attracting it. Based on a manufacturing sub-sector 
literature review and consultation with donors, MOs and experts and DFID's Country Expansion 
Analysis ('Where Invest Africa should expand in the future'), table 3 provides an assessment of 
investment attraction with regard to resource-seeking, domestic/regional market and global 
export/efficiency seeking investments for each of the earlier selected subsectors (see table 2). These 
investment opportunities apply both for domestic and foreign (FDI) investors.  









Food and beverages ++ ++ + 
Wood and furniture  ++ ++ + 
Paper and pulp - + + 
Textiles, clothing - + ++ 
Leather and footwear + ++ ++ 
Automotive  -  ++ - 
Basic metals and metal 
products 
+ ++ - 
Glass and non-metallic 
products 
+ + + 
Chemicals (rubber/plastic) + ++ + 
Machinery and equipment - ++ - 
Printing and publishing - + - 
Petroleum refining ++ ++ + 
Construction / cement - ++ - 
Pharmaceuticals - ++ ++ 
Electronics and precision 
equipment 
- ++ + 
 
   Legend: ++ : High attraction + : Medium attraction  - : No or very little attraction 
 
*) Attractive countries for resource-seeking investments include Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda and Zimbabwe 
**) Attractive countries for domestic/regional market-seeking investments include DR Congo, Kyrgyz republic, 
Liberia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Tajikistan and Zambia. 
***) Attractive countries for global export/ efficiency-seeking investments include Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Vietnam. Combined market- efficiency seeking investment profile: India, Indonesia, Ghana, Kenya, 




























3. Setting a manufacturing programme framework  
 
The previous chapters (Part A) of this document reviewed trends and prospects of manufacturing 
subsectors in developing countries. Part B introduces operational aspects and practical considerations 
for the actual development of DFID manufacturing support programmes. This begins with setting of 
an overall programme framework, which includes a country (or region)-specific selection of promising 
manufacturing subsectors and the identification of binding constraints in these manufacturing 
subsectors.  
Most national governments in developing countries identified and prioritised manufacturing 
subsectors within larger macro-economic growth strategies. To promote programme effectiveness of 
DFID support programmes, it is essential to consider local initiatives and insights. The selection of 
manufacturing subsectors could also be complemented and compared with the various existing 
subsector analyses work of DFID, WB, UNIDO and ILO to name but a few.68  
The subsequent paragraphs provide suggestions for designing country-focused manufacturing 
programmes. However, the principles, approaches and issues are relevant to a broader set of DFID 
programmes which relate to manufacturing, e.g. regional programmes and issue specific 
programmes.69   
3.1 Prospects and opportunities for subsector development 
Methods that can be useful in identifying suitable manufacturing sub-sectors to focus on include: 
an assessment of a country’s revealed comparative advantage (which assesses a country’s sector 
strengths based on trade data); complementary product-space assessment (which looks at a 
country’s capability to produce one good based on the existing capability to produce similar 
goods); binding constraints analysis (which prioritises the challenges holding back economic 
growth); and enterprise mapping (which identifies the major firms operating in different sub-
sectors and analyses trends in how they established themselves).  This section describes how 
these approaches can be applied to programme development. 
Recent theoretical and practical insights suggest the importance of explicitly focusing on a few key 
subsectors in support programmes instead. MOs specialised in industrialisation, such as UNIDO and 
ILO, systematically apply a subsector approach in their programming. Within these organisations, 
there is general agreement that promoting the manufacturing sector in a generic way is less effective 
and less efficient than having a subsector focus. 
Revealed comparative advantage (static) 
The optimal manufacturing structure in a country, which will make the country most competitive 
(based on its current economic opportunities), is determined by its endowment structure.70 
Consequently, the best way to upgrade a country’s endowment structure is to develop its industries, 
and selected manufacturing subsectors, according to the comparative advantages determined.71 The 
                                                        
68 The DFID-funded International Growth Centre (IGC) provides demand-led policy advice on manufacturing sub 
sectors. The IGC country enterprise maps series offers a solid basis for selecting subsectors. See 
https://www.theigc.org/ and https://www.theigc.org/impact/mapping-industrialisation-africa/ 
69 Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) for example 
70 Lin, J. Y. 2012. New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development and Policy. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 




economy will be most competitive, the economic surplus will be the largest, and the capital 
accumulation and the upgrading of factor endowment structure will be the fastest possible. 
There are various ways to assess comparative advantage. One way is to look into competitiveness of 
subsectors on markets. For instance, if a country’s products are being successfully exported to global 
markets or are competing with imports in domestic markets with no government help, the country is 
sure to have a comparative advantage in these products. Similarly, if, without heavy government 
subsidies, an industry producing exports is attracting a growing amount of FDI, the country has a 
comparative advantage in those goods as well. Foreign direct investors have a keen sense of what 
countries produce that is competitive on international markets.  
For existing products, the concept of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) can be used to pinpoint 
industries in which increased production could accelerate overall industrialisation. This is a traditional 
method based on a country’s trade data. The RCA based on trade data can be determined either 
quantitatively using the Balassa index, after Balassa (1965),72 or qualitatively through the inspection 
of detailed import data. Details of the RCA method and one example of RCA note (Zimbabwe) is 
presented in Annex A.73  
Dynamics of comparative advantage; infant industries  
Although the RCA view offers one practical approach as a basis for subsector selection, it is important 
to signal that countries’ CA is dynamic and changes over time. The difference between the static 
traditional (Ricardian) view and the dynamic view on CA has important policy and subsector 
programme implications, for instance including a focus on infant industries.74 The static view 
identifies the most efficient allocation of resources initially at one point in time. This existing 
comparative advantage provides a relatively easy focus area for manufacturing development in the 
short run, however, the reality in many developing countries is that their static comparative advantage 
goods, in most instances, happen to be agricultural commodities and natural resources. 
The dynamic view, on the other hand, recognises that a country can shift its comparative advantage 
over time, including through government intervention, in ways that may improve its economic and 
social development. The promotion of domestic infant industries (which have little chance of 
competing head-to-head with the established firms located in the developed countries), for example 
through protection from trade competition, is based on a dynamic theory of comparative advantage.  
In addition, the argument for protecting infant industries is that the management and organisational 
skills necessary to produce agricultural goods and natural resources are not the same as the skills and 
knowledge needed to build an industrial economy.75 If true, then concentrating production in one's 
static comparative advantage goods would prevent the development of an industrial economy. Thus, 
one of the reasons for protecting an infant industry is to stimulate the learning effects that will improve 
productive efficiency. Furthermore, these learning effects might spill over into the rest of the economy 
as managers and workers open new businesses or move to other industries in the economy. 
                                                        
72 Balassa, B. 1965. Trade liberalization and ‘revealed’ comparative advantage. The Manchester 
School of Economic and Social Studies 33: 92-123. 
73 Several studies on comparative advantage exist, however, there is no coordination in studies for developing 
countries. IMC suggests developing a comparable series of RCA country notes for all country where DFID has 
presence. 





In conclusion, an assessment of revealed comparative advantage can offer initial indications of sub-
sectors on which to focus.  However, developing more productive sector strengths may require active 
intervention.  Such intervention has been key to the development of the industrial sector in more recent 
industrial success stories such as South Korea and Taiwan. However, such intervention needs to 
account of risks, including the industry failing to take off and the potential harm it can bring to 
consumers. 
Product space  
There is a point that ‘winning’ subsectors that are already successful with competing products at global 
and domestic markets may not need any further (donor) assistance. However, subsectors that are 
‘nearby’ and still unlocked might be a more interesting target for donors’ support. A complementing 
approach to identify growth opportunities of these ‘nearby’ manufacturing subsectors is the ‘Product 
Space’ concept.76 The underlying idea is that manufacturing (radically) new products is quite different 
from producing more of the same. Each product involves highly specific inputs such as knowledge, 
physical assets, intermediate inputs, labour training requirements, infrastructure needs, property rights, 
regulatory requirements or other public goods. Established manufacturing subsectors somehow have 
sorted out the many potential failures involved in assuring the presence of all of these inputs, which 
are then available to subsequent entrants in the industry. But firms that venture into new products will 
find it much harder to secure the requisite inputs and all required infrastructure.  
Product space idea is the probability that a country will develop the capability to be good at producing 
one good is related to its installed capability in the production of other similar, or nearby goods where 
the current existing productive capabilities can be easily adapted.77 Thus, the speed of structural 
transformation will depend on the density of the product space near the area where each country has 
developed its productive capabilities and its comparative advantage. If a country develops comparative 
advantage in a certain good, many firms can enter, producing an intra-industry spill over. In addition, 
these capabilities now shorten the distance to other goods, producing inter-industry spill overs. 
As a conceptual tool, it can help DFID determine which products require productive know-how that 
is similar to the know-how a country already has. One such tool can be a map of the product space as 
presented in Annex C. 
Once promising subsectors and product spaces in a country or region are identified, the next step in 
the development of a manufacturing support programme is to identify the binding constraints that 
hamper the subsector’s growth and development potential. This typically involves a context-specific 
multifaceted set of constraints, at different levels (macroeconomic, institutional, firm-level), some 
more important than others. It requires a holistic systemic view involving the “usual suspects” 
including finance, policies, institutional functioning and firm level limitations to name but a few.  
However, programmes attempting to address all issues at once often get stuck in a myriad of 
uncoordinated programme activities, measures and interventions without much of a prioritisation.   
Hausmann et al.78 acknowledged this downside of a holistic approach and developed an alternative 
growth-diagnostic model which focuses on addressing the most binding constraints in the formulation 
                                                        
76 Hidalgo. C., Klinger B., Barabási A. and Hausmann R. 2007. The product space conditions the development of 
nations. Science 27: 317(5837):482-7. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17656717 
77 Hausmann, R. & Klinger, B. 2006. Structural Transformation and Patterns of Comparative Advantage in the 
Product Space. KSG Working Paper No. RWP06-041; CID Working Paper No. 128. Available at SSRN:  
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78 Hausmann, R., D. Rodrik and A. Velasco. 2005. Growth Diagnostics. Growth Lab Harvard University. Revised 
March 2005. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.446.2212&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
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of economic policies and programmes. The argument is that it is seldom helpful to a long list of 
development interventions and institutional reforms; many of which may not be targeted at the most 
binding constraints on economic growth. Public means and programme budgets are better deployed 
in alleviating binding constraints than in going after too many targets all at once.  
Moreover, Hausmann et al. stress that the binding constraints on economic activity differ from setting 
to setting. An identical growth strategy for all countries, regardless of their circumstances, is unlikely 
to be productive. Taking context-specificity into account is essential.   
Manufacturing subsector growth-diagnostic tool 
Whereas the Hausmann growth-diagnostic model is developed for overall economic policy 
frameworks, (see original decision tree in the Hausmann growth-diagnostic model Annex C), table 4 
presents an adapted version targeted at manufacturing subsectors. This analytical framework is based 
on Haussmann’s decision tree combined with insights of manufacturing subsector constraints in 
DFID’s manufacturing programmes and programmes of other donors and multilateral organisations79. 
It includes the essential elements from Hausmann’s original decision tree such as human capital, 
infrastructure, property rights, corruption, taxes, political and fiscal stability, market failures, domestic 
saving, international finance and financial intermediation. Instead of breaking down the binding 
constraints along a decision tree, this variant suggests to breakdown, unravel and organise the binding 
constraints in a matrix with the following two dimensions.  
Dimension 1 - Type of issue: 
- Capital and technology issues, which relate directly to strengthening capital and technology 
capabilities of the firm.  
- External and regulatory environment issues (non-financial and non-technology) refers to the 
institutional, policy, regulatory and administrative, and physical environment  
- Issues concerning interactions between actors, including commercial and market linkages within 
a value chain as well as public-private dialogues, intermediary organisations and interactions with 
societal stakeholders. 
Dimension 2 - Level and ‘owner’ of the binding constraint: 
- Macro: the issues that concern the national government responsible for higher level policies, 
subsector priorities, long-term industrialisation vision. The macro level strengthens the 
institutional and physical context providing stability and trust for manufacturing firms in the long 
run. 
- Meso: the issues that concern intermediary/local institutions actors related to the daily functioning 
of formal government institutions, market institutions, value chains, regulatory frameworks and 
intermediary institutions.  
- Micro: the issues that concern firm level actors and single business units.  
 
Enterprise maps 
To identify and prioritise the situation and status of the binding constraint for each cell (table 4) in a 
certain subsector in a given country, DFID programme staff may consult the ‘Enterprise Map’ series 
developed by the DFID funded International Growth Centre (IGC) Alternatives may be locally 
available (such as that in Kenya produced by the Kenya Manufacturers Association) or compile similar 
work themselves. Enterprise Maps aims to provide a standardised descriptive account of the industrial 
capabilities of selected countries. The series provides practical information of the subsector in the 
                                                        
79 See output A and B of the IMC manufacturing portfolio review.   
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country of study: the structure of the subsector, the supply and marketing chain, the policy context, 
the export status, the strength and potential, and the recent developments. Moreover, detailed profiles 
are provided of leading companies in the country’s market, current activities and products, 
organisation and management, firm capabilities, competition, supply and marketing chain, exports, 
challenges and the development agenda. This provides a comprehensive view of the current frontier 
of industrial capabilities in the country. In particular, the history of each of these profiled companies 
is presented, so that the reader can trace the origins of current industrial capabilities. This helps identify 
trends which may inform the approach to encouraging new firms to grow or enter the market. The 
series is downloadable at: https://www.theigc.org/project/the-enterprise-map-series/. 
If the enterprise map for a given country is not available or outdated, DFID field staff may coordinate 
the development of an enterprise map and engage specialised expertise.  Relevant primary data may 
be collected via qualitative semi-structured interviews with firm owners within a subsector, 
government actors and other stakeholders. Additionally, a survey with a representative sample of the 
sector stakeholder allows the evaluation and prioritisation of the ‘urgent’ binding constrain in 
quantitative terms.  
Development of future approaches to manufacturing support 
One method by which DFID has identified manufacturing programmes is to assess the historical 
development of manufacturing sectors in further advanced countries and assess what factors have been 
critical to their success. For example, ‘Invest Africa’ was created based on the analysis that a) global 
manufacturing buyer networks were important but that developing countries are likely under-
connected to them; b) FDI has been key in the growth of other industrialised countries, e.g. Bangladesh 
and Vietnam. Undertaking further similar analysis may reveal other promising ways of supporting the 







Table 4: Binding constraint diagnostics for manufacturing subsectors  
 
 






of the firm 




Institutional context  
Physical environment 
context 
Business and market 
linkages 
Public-private linkages 
Macro Inappropriate financial 
policies (e.g. interest 
rates) that weaken 
firms’ capability to 
invest or secure FDI for 
manufacturing.  
 
Political and fiscal 
instability in the 
country providing 
insufficient trust for 
FDI and domestic 
investment. 
National education and 
training policies do not 
focus on strengthening 
human capital of 
manufacturing firms 
(advanced and practical 










firms to innovate.  
 






No or weak national 




Industrial policies not 
designed according to 
revealed comparative 
advantage and product 












policies for domestic 
manufacturing firms. 
 
Conflicting trade and 
market liberalisation 
policies, or global 
issues such as 





private policy dialogues 
(PPPD) on economic 
(manufacturing) agenda  
 
Limited social dialogue 
between government and 
civil society actors on 
labour rights, gender 
equality and 
environmental issues.    
 
 
Meso  Insufficient functioning 
of banks and financial 
institutions for 
providing finance to 
manufacturing firms 
(bureaucratic 
procedures, low risk 
appetite, high interest 
rates etc.) 
 
Firm’s limited access to 
investment (domestic 
and FDI) and working 
capital.  
 








Weak capability of 
private and public 




human capital of 
manufacturing firms. 
Weak transfer of 







technical training for 







Weak functioning of 
operational gov. 
institutions (corruption, 
low skills) for business 
licences, property 
rights, taxes  
 








Few or no special 
Economic Zones 
(SEZs) available and in 
operation; bad SEZ 
design / management.  
 
Little space and 
facilities for industrial 
clustering 
 
Poor access to business 
and industrial clusters 








Difficult entry and 
integration into global 
value chains. 
 










Micro  Limited financial 
management 
knowledge of managers 
to secure investment in 
manufacturing.   
 
Management 
knowledge and skills of 
managers is insufficient 








taking within firms. No 
technology integration.  
 
Quality standards 
procedures are not 
known about or 






perceptions in society 
towards manufacturing. 
 
Limited availability of 
land or possibility to 
construct 
manufacturing plants 
and workshops.  
 
 
Few or no linkages with 
and limited access to 
local value chain and 
industrial clusters.  
 
 
Local authorities are not 




Manufacturers do not 
trust local authorities.  
 
Low motivation to 
comply with labour laws.  
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4. Support approaches and methodology  
 
After having identified the promising subsectors in a country or region, and the associated binding 
constraints, next is the design and formulation of operational details of the approach and methodology 
to address the binding constraints. The mechanisms to address the binding constraints in a DFID 
programme are typically presented in the format of a logical framework, setting the overall outcomes 
and impact as well as output (results) and inputs (activities) of a programme.  
A notable observation, as an outcome of the analysis of DFID’s portfolio of manufacturing 
programmes, is that programmes do not have specific outcomes and outputs defined with regard to 
the manufacturing sector development.80 Or manufacturing support concerns are fragmented and there 
are implicit activities within programmes. However, if DFID is to ramp up its work on structural 
transformation successfully, it is essential for programmes with a strong manufacturing focus to be 
explicit about the manufacturing targets in the logical framework. 
4.1 Manufacturing programme outcomes 
Essential in the design of support programmes is the inclusion of manufacturing-specific 
indicators, particularly in programmes with a primary focus on manufacturing. The section 
below provides examples of logframe indicators which could be used for programmes with a 
manufacturing component. 
The most evident (and used) measures of structural transformation are GDP, value added, 
employment, investment and export to measure structural transformation81. Examples of the 
operationalisation of manufacturing programme outcomes to include in the logical framework are 
suggested in table 5 on the next page.  
As mentioned, limited reference is made to the indicators suggested in table 5 in DFID’s current 
portfolio of manufacturing programmes. Some programmes such as ‘Invest Africa’ and CDC are 
reporting on indictors on investment in manufacturing as a whole. Many more programmes involve 
job creation, but these are not linked to manufacturing. More often, programmes define indicators that 
are directly linked to the programme activities, such as the number of laws and regulations adopted, 
the number of beneficiaries trained, or number of businesses established.  
There is a strong case to include manufacturing-specific indicators assessment for the targeted 
subsectors in the log frame of a programme. This implies the inclusion of these indicators in baseline 
studies, and monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) studies (see also paragraph 5.2). This will 
allow DFID to attribute programme activities to the manufacturing subsectors in terms of GDP figures 
and employment. For instance, the direct job creation of a programme might be low; the (proximate) 
indirect jobs may also be low; but the argument of structural transformation is that that the (non-
proximate) indirect jobs are high. Measuring manufacturing-specific indicators will provide broader 
insight and enable structural transformation impact assessment of manufacturing support programmes.  
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Table 5: Suggested manufacturing-specific programme indicators to include in the logical framework 




- Growth of manufacturing subsector GDP 
- Contribution of manufacturing GDP to total GDP 
 
Absolute figures in local currency and share 
(%) 
Share (%) of total GDP 
Value added: 
- Value added growth of manufacturing subsector 
- Share of manufacturing in total value added  
 
Absolute figures in local currency and share 
(%) 
% of total value added 
Investment in manufacturing: 




- Direct job creation in manufacturing subsector 
Proximate and non-proximate job creation  
- Share of employment in manufacturing in total 
employment  
 
# of jobs and description of job quality 
% of employment 
 
Export: 
- Export growth in manufacturing subsector  
- Share of manufacturing in total export   
 
Growth (%) in manufacturing export volume 
per subsector (%).   
 
 
4.2 Manufacturing programme inputs 
 
Manufacturing can best be promoted through a comprehensive approach addressing various 
issues at various levels in a coordinated way. The framework below provides a useful structure 
for developing manufacturing programme activities that target problems identified through the 
earlier analytical process. 
Support programmes involving inputs with a primary focus on manufacturing, or as a subcomponent, 
which happens often in generic private sector development programme. Generic private sector support 
inputs, such as improving finance, infrastructure and the business climate, that are critical for business 
in general, and for manufacturing as well. In addition, there are support inputs such as production 
technology, product manufacturing standards, subsector-focused integration in global value chains 
that relate more to manufacturing (there is however not a strict line between generic and manufacturing 
support approaches). Figure 3 suggest that both require a combination of generic and manufacturing-






















 Generic approaches: 
 Finance/FDI 
 Business/investment climate 
 Institutional development 
 Business development services 
Specific manufacturing approaches:  
 Technology and innovation 
 Production management 
capabilities 
 Product quality standards 










Increased importance of the 
manufacturing sub-sectors 
(jobs, GDP%, exports in 
manufacturing) 
 
Selection of programme inputs  
The types of support input (activities) to include in the logical framework of a programme could be 
based on the earlier identified binding constraints of the prioritised subsector (table 4).  The matrix in 
table 6 provides various suggestions of types of manufacturing-specific activities, which are based on 
analysis of DFID’s existing manufacturing portfolio and those of other donors and MOs.82 It should 
be noted that the matrix below suggests manufacturing-specific input/activities for support 
programmes.  
Similarly, to the identification of the binding constrain in table 4, programme inputs could be 
structured and organised along the same dimensions. 
Dimension 1 - Type of activities and inputs: 
- Strengthening financial and human capital and technology capabilities of the firm.  
- External and regulatory environment issues (non-financial and non-technology). 
- Promoting and streamlining interactions between actors in respect of commercial and market 
linkages as well as public-private dialogue, intermediary organisations and interactions with 
societal stakeholders. 
Dimension 2 - Level of issue (target group or beneficiary of the activity and input): 
- Actors within the government responsible for higher level policies, subsector priorities, long-term 
industrialisation vision.  
- Intermediary/local institutions actors related to the daily functioning of formal government 
institutions, market institutions, value chains, regulatory frameworks and intermediary 
institutions.  
- Micro: firm level actors and single business units.  
 
                                                        
82 See output A and B of the IMC manufacturing portfolio review.   
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Table 6: Suggested manufacturing-specific input/activities for support programmes 
 
 









Institutional context  
Physical environment 
context 
Business and market 
linkages 
Public-private linkages 
Macro   To support the 
government to develop 
financial policies 
established (e.g. interest 
rates) that promote 
domestic savings and 
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To communicate global 










through FDI.   
 
To create a platform for 
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stakeholders about 
societal issues including 
labour rights, 
environmental impact in 
manufacturing 
Meso  To establish or support 
a fund/facility 
providing grants and 




To enable affordable 
access to credit for 
manufacturers through 


















To promote the transfer 
of knowledge via 




To conduct professional 
technical training for 
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manufactured products. 
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subsector industrial 
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To promote the 
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Micro  To provide finance and 
finance-related 











To develops technical 
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of staff and managers is 
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Technical Assistance 






To change negative 
attitudes and 














To support integration 
on local (value 
chain/clusters) linkages  
 
To support global (value 
chain/UK business/FDI)  
manufacturing 
programmes create 
commercial links with 
UK firms 
 
To facilitate compliance 
with labour laws  
 
To facilitate contacts 






4.3 Societal issues and challenges  
Safeguarding society from harmful impacts as a result of manufacturing development is a 
prerequisite.  Manufacturing programmes should explicitly promote the position of women in 
the sector, assure good social and labour conditions and practices and prevent environmental 
degradation. This paragraph discusses considerations, suggestions and examples of addressing 
societal issues and challenges. 
Against the background of DFID’s inclusive development agenda, it is essential that successful 
expansion of the manufacturing subsector in developing countries generates positive societal change, 
while not causing harm, particularly for vulnerable groups in society or on the environment83. Special 
attention, therefore, is required to address gender, labour and environmental issues in the design and 
implementation of manufacturing programmes.  
In DFID’s current portfolio, 67% of the programmes mention the inclusion of explicit gender 
considerations, 24% report that they address social and labour conditions and 30% address 
environmental issues. A further qualitative exploration into these numbers84 reveals that there are 
various degrees and levels to which societal issues and challenges are addressed. This section 
summarizes considerations and suggestions from DFID existing programmes and those of other 
donors and MOs, to address societal issues in manufacturing support programmes.   
Promote gender equality 
The UN’s SDG#5 states that gender equality is a necessary foundation for a prosperous and sustainable 
world. In manufacturing, several particular gender issues are at play requiring particular attention. 
Table 7 presents and overview of such typical gender issues in manufacturing in developing countries 
and approaches or safeguards how these issues could be addressed. While women’s participation and 
ownership of smallholder enterprises is widely seen in the informal sector in most developing 
countries, it is less common in more advanced and larger manufacturing industries.85  
There are several programmes currently implemented by DFID, other donors and MOs, that include 
the approaches as suggested in Table 7. For example, the DFID programme ‘Afghanistan Investment 
Climate Programme (AICP/300175)’ addresses legal and regulatory barriers constraining women and 
girls’ entry to set up enterprises, with a view to promote female ownership. UNIFEM’s programme 
‘Women Global Innovation Coalition for Change’ identifies the key barriers to women and girls’ 
advancement in innovation, technology and entrepreneurship, 86 which enables women to attain higher 
management and technical positions. The WB’s ‘Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative (We-Fi)’ 
addresses obstacles faced by women entrepreneurs, in manufacturing amongst others, through 
innovative and tailored financial instruments, including guarantee mechanisms. ILO implements the 
‘Women's Entrepreneurship Development (WED)’ programme87 , which is a more generic 
programme. It promotes changes in both women’s access (to the opportunities, services, and assets 
                                                        
83 Noting that there may in some cases be a trade-off to be made between supporting manufacturing growth and 
protecting the environment / managing climate change. 
84 Output A of the DFID’s Manufacturing Portfolio Review: the spreadsheet includes a descriptive part of how the 
various manufacturing programmes of DFID address societal issues.  






required to sustainably upgrade one’s economic standing) and in agency (capacity and confidence to 
act on available opportunities, and to influence decision-making at various levels). 
Table 7: Gender issues and approaches to promote gender equality in manufacturing programmes. 
Gender issues in manufacturing Programme (logframe) approaches and guarantees to 
promote gender equality 
Low female employment rates manufacturing 
firms. Women represent only 38% of the 
manufacturing workforce in Africa.88  
 
- Setting female employment rate targets and standards 
in programme as logframe indicators.  
- Understanding (and correcting) uneven female 
employment rates in different contexts. (N.B.: Female 
employment rates apparently are higher in FDI SEZ 
manufacturing than in domestic manufacturing.89) 
Low representation of women in higher executive 
and management positions, including higher 
qualified technical engineering jobs. 
 
- Dissemination of knowledge and scientific insights 
about the advantages of diversity in management and 
technical positions of the workforce.90 
- Tailors education and training. 
- Set female management and technical positions. 
ambitions and standards in programme indicators.  
Unequal remuneration for men and women in 
manufacturing industries. 
 
- Setting equal pay targets and standards in programme 
logframe indicators.  
- Requirement of publishing sex segregated 
remuneration data.  
Limited personal development opportunities within 
manufacturing firms  
- Inclusion of HRM focused on women’s careers in 
business plans. 
- Management and technical education. 
Poor (gender sensitive) working conditions and 
social protection.  
- Working hours in manufacturing enterprises do not 
match other roles of women in society (child and 
family care and community management). 
Limited female ownership in formal larger 
manufacturing firms91 due to legal/regulatory 
constraints.  
- Addressing legal and regulatory barriers constraining 
women and girls’ entry to set up enterprises.  
Lower access (than men) to formal credit limits 
female entrepreneurs to graduate their (informal) 
businesses to formal larger manufacturing firms. 
- Tailored credit programmes 
- FDI and domestic investment promotions focused on 
female entrepreneurs in manufacturing.   
- Providing guarantees  
Traditional gender roles limit women to graduate 
their informal businesses into larger formal 
manufacturing firms.  
- Awareness raising campaigns.  
 
                                                        
88 UNIDO. 2016. Industrialization in Africa and Least Developed Countries - Boosting growth, creating jobs, 
promoting inclusiveness and sustainability. A report to the G20 development working group by UNIDO. Vienna: 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization. 
89 Women often predominate in the SEZ workforce, with women comprising an average of 60-80 % of the total 
workforce in zones globally (see Farole, T. 2011. Special Economic Zones in Africa: Comparing Performance and 
Learning from Global Experience. Washington DC: World Bank). This is largely due to the type of unskilled labour 
opportunities created and it provides real opportunities to bring women into formal, salaried employment. 
90 Ritter-Hayashi, D., Vermeulen, P. A. M., & Knoben, J. 2016. Gender Diversity and Innovation: The Role of 
Women’s Economic Opportunity in Developing Countries. (DFID Working Paper). Nijmegen: Radboud University 
Nijmegen. 
91 While women’s ownership of smallholder enterprises is widely seen in the informal sector in most developing 
countries, it is less common in more advanced and larger manufacturing industries. See: Yong, L. 2017. Africa’s 
industrialisation: leaving no woman behind. OECD blog https://oecd-development-matters.org/2017/04/25/africas-
industrialisation-leaving-no-woman-behind/ 
45 
Labour issues  
UN SDG #8 advocates the promotion of decent work opportunities and the creation of the conditions 
that allow people to have quality jobs. A particular priority in the context of manufacturing promotion 
is creating stable jobs while safeguarding labour conditions. Harsh working conditions in developing 
countries pose challenges around manufacturing promotion.92 Labour conditions and labour rights in 
general are under stress because power has shifted from producers to traders and retailers and local 
laws regulating labour markets have limited effect.93 Limited enforcement, often due to resource 
constraints, raises the importance of understanding firm-level decisions concerning working 
conditions.94 A priority is compliance with labour standards in manufacturing programmes, including 
social security systems and labour protection. Table 8 presents and overview of labour issues that 
typically emerge in manufacturing programmes in developing countries and approaches and 
guarantees on how these issues could be addressed by manufacturing support programmes. 
Table 8: Labour issues and approaches to safeguard good labour practices in manufacturing. 
Labour issues in manufacturing programmes Programme (logframe) approaches and guarantees to 
promote labour issues 
Labour rights: unregulated employment 
contracts, long working hours, no right to 
unionise).  
- Building the Government’s capacity to strengthen design 
of and implement labour rights policies and regulatory 
frameworks.  
- Supporting the establishment or strengthening of trade 
unions, workers unions or branch associations (this may 
be politically sensitive).  
Unhealthy and dangerous labour conditions in 
developing countries. 
- Building the Government’s capacity to regulate safety 
and labour standards.  
- Supporting the establishment or strengthening of trade 
unions, workers unions or branch associations. 
- Linking up with international certifications and labour 
protection control systems. 
Social security systems and labour protection. - Assistance to Government in its efforts to strengthen 
social security such as access to health care and income 
security (old age, unemployment, sickness, invalidity, 
work injury or maternity) 
- Development of firm-level social security provisions. 
Low pay of workings - Strengthening the bargaining position at production side 
of GVCs via clustering of enterprises. 
- Publish payment standards open access.  
Child labour (see a box 4 below).95 - Supporting children’s rights through education/media. 
 
Several programmes of DFID, other donors and MOs currently implement the above-mentioned 
approaches.  current example of a DFID programme that addresses labour conditions is ‘Better Jobs 
                                                        
92 Brown, D., Dehejia, R. and Robertson, R. 2016. Laws, Costs, Norms, and Learning: Improving Working 
Conditions in Developing Countries. IZA Discussion Paper No. 10025. 
93 Ali, R. & Katkar, A. 2015. Globalization positive or negative? - Efforts to eradicate unjust and unfavourable 
working conditions beneath Globalization. Blog http://romiyaaliandaayushkatkar.blogspot.com/2015/ 
94 Brown, D., Dehejia, R. and Robertson, R. 2016. Laws, Costs, Norms, and Learning: Improving Working 
Conditions in Developing Countries. IZA Discussion Paper No. 10025. 
95 Children are involved at the end of supply chains producing for domestic markets, in home-based, informal work 
to assemble parts of finish products in a wide range of industries (See: ILO. 2002. A Future Without Child Labour: 
Global Report Under the Follow Up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Geneva: 
International Labour Organisation). 
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in Bangladesh (205275)’, implemented in collaboration with ILO. The programme works with 
garment factories to improve safety standards as well as occupational health and safety practices. In 
addition, the programme builds the government’s capacity to regulate safety and labour standards in 
all factories in Bangladesh. It pushes for the adoption of compliance standards in participating 
factories. A related programme of ILO/IFC is ‘Better Work’ which aims to improve labour standards 
and competitiveness in global value chains in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Nicaragua and Vietnam. ILO/IFC carries out such programmes via direct support 
to enterprises and via dialogue among government, employers, trade union, labour unions and other 
partners. 
Box 1: Child labour in garments, a t-shirt printing company in Bangladesh96 
 
The company in Chittagong prints letters, shapes and figures on textiles for T-shirts, as subcontract orders for domestic 
garment industries, who in turn produce for large international buyers. The company has 40 employees, who all live 
nearby – “they are hard-working and loyal”. The company employs children too of around 14 years of age. The owner 
mentions that their families force him to employ them. He believes it is better that they work in a company since they 
lack government or other support – “they are not educated, and they have nothing to do. If they do not work in a 
company, they do illegal work like selling drugs or theft.”  
 
The owner stresses that on the one hand the international buyers 
force local producers to comply, but on the other, they 
continuously negotiate the price down - “we fulfil their 
requirements, but we get lower payments for our work after all. 
We do not get a fair share.” The larger garment industries in 
Bangladesh do not have any child labour due to international 
pressure, only small subcontractors like his company. Sometimes 
the international buyers also come to visit the subcontractor – 
“someone is watching out and then we hide the working children.”   
  
The imposed compliance is not making things better for the work force at the small producers’ side in Bangladesh. In 
his view, the government is not developing policies to promote the sector for the benefit for Bangladesh, nor to solve 
the compliance issue – “they do not bother, they are busy taking money though corruption. To improve the compliance 
challenges of the sector, the owner feels that non-government garment-related organisations and garment trade bodies 
are better placed and committed to look after the industry.  
 
Environmentally sound production  
Manufacturing in developing countries is very often associated with severe environmental 
degradation, high levels of pollution and negative impacts on public health. 97 The manufacturing 
processes currently being employed in most developing countries have a number of characteristics 
that render them unsustainable in the long term. These include outdated infrastructure, machinery and 
inefficient methods, which generate high levels of pollution and widespread environmental 
degradation, as well as inefficient use of energy and natural resources and high levels of carbon 
emissions. They are also responsible for affecting the health of the general population through toxic 
                                                        
96 Voeten, J. & Nurul Absar, M. 2018. Bangladesh: Qualitative study on Innovation in Manufacturing Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs): Exploration of Policy and Research Issues. DFID research project “Enabling 
Innovation and Productivity Growth in Low Income Countries (EIP-LIC)”, Tilburg: Tilburg University. 
97 Pure Earth and Green Cross. 2016. World’s Worst Pollution Problems 2015 - The New Top Six Toxic Threats: A 
Priority List for Remediation. Pure Earth and Green Cross Switzerland. https://www.greencross.ch/wp-
content/uploads/uploads/media/pollution_report_2015_top_six_wwpp.pdf 
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contamination of vital resources, such as: air, drinking water, soils, food crops, livestock and fish. In 
future years, building a manufacturing sector that is efficient, technologically innovative and 
sustainable, both in environmental and social terms, will be crucial to ensuring continued economic 
growth and improving well-being in developing countries.98  
Table 9 presents an overview of environmental issues that typically emerge in manufacturing 
programmes in developing countries and approaches and guarantees on how these issues could be 
addressed DFID programmes. 
Table 9: Environmental issues and approaches to address these in manufacturing programmes. 
Environmental issues in manufacturing 
programmes 
Programme (logframe) approaches and guarantees to 
address the environmental issues 
Environmental protection policies of 
Government are often inappropriate or not 
effectively implemented. Enforcement and 
control techniques are not yet fully developed. 
- Identification and adoption of suitable policy-based 
interventions targeted at manufacturing firms by 
Government at various levels.  
- Capacity development of environment policy-making and 
regulation enforcement agencies.  
Manufacturing firms pay little attention to 
environmental protection and standards. 
- Awareness activities and campaigns and knowledge 
dissemination for business owners and workers.  
- The development of business models that include 
environmental costs and concerns. 
Polluting production processes and technology 
in manufacturing and industrial activity.  
- Development and application of technology-based 
solutions, cleaner production methods and systems that will 
reduce the environmental impact and pollution generated 
by manufacturing.  
- Promotion of ‘leapfrog’ technological and frugal 
innovations.99  
Environmental degradation and resource 
depletion. 
- The development and application of technology-based 
solutions involving less (more efficient) use of natural 
resource or alternative inputs.  
- Promotion of circular economy.  
Accumulation of harmful environmental 
problems concentrated in SEZs and industrial 
areas. 
- Integrated approach of greening of industrial parks and 
SEZs,  
Lack of data and information about the 
environmental impacts of manufacturing.  
- Generation of evidence to support practical solutions, 
including evidence on the environmental, economic and 
social impacts and the social and political economy 
influences that drive environmental changes. 
 
Several programmes of DFID, other donors and MOs currently implement the above-mentioned 
approaches. The DFID manufacturing programme ‘Sustainable Manufacturing and Environmental 
Pollution (SMEP/300124)’, contributes to the identification, development and application of 
technology-based solutions, cleaner production methods and systems that will reduce the 
environmental impact and pollution generated by manufacturing in developing countries. The GIZ 
programme ‘Sustainable and environment-friendly industrial production (SEIP)’ provides support for 
greening India's industrial zones through individual zone support, policy reform. It proposes new 
                                                        
98 DFID, 2018, Business case of the programme "Sustainable Manufacturing and Environmental Pollution (SMEP)". 
https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-GOV-1-300124/documents. 
99 Leapfrogging (innovation) refers to skipping inferior, less efficient, more expensive or more polluting technologies 
and manufacturing processes and move directly to more advanced ones. Through leapfrogging developing countries 
can avoid environmentally harmful stages of development and do not need to follow the polluting development 
trajectory of industrialized countries. See: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2017/10/11/africa-can-enjoy-
leapfrog-development 
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measures for the policies, plans and support programmes intended to prevent or reduce pollution and 
to improve resource efficiency in industrial zones. An IFC programme example is the ‘Partnership for 
Cleaner Textile Programme (PaCT)’ in Bangladesh supports the textile industry in adopting cleaner 
production. UNIDO could be interesting in the framework of its green industry initiative100 and the 
promotion of the circular economy in several of its programmes. 
 
  
                                                        
100 https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2010-11/Green_Industry_Initiative_0.pdf 
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5. Organisational implications 
 
5.1 DFID’s spending on manufacturing support   
While there is a large variation between DFID countries in terms of spending on manufacturing 
support, most countries lack a dedicated manufacturing programme. This includes some 
countries with significant manufacturing potential – such as Pakistan and Myanmar. To reflect 
DFID’s commitment to supporting “economic transformation”, consideration should be given 
to developing and implementing programmes with a primary and explicit focus on 
manufacturing in more target countries. 
DFID is implementing 72 manufacturing and manufacturing-related programmes at present. Among 
the programmes, only a minor share of 13 programmes has a primary focus on manufacturing (i.e. 
>50% of spend is on manufacturing), whereas 20 programmes have a partial focus and 39 programmes 
a limited focus on manufacturing. Apart from the relatively low number of primary focus programmes, 
DFID’s portfolio of manufacturing programmes also shows many fragmented and implicit support 
activities and variation in spending among the different central department and countries where DFID 
has presence.101 In these programmes, the manufacturing component is often side-lined with no 
specific manufacturing indicators defined in the logframe.  
There is also a relatively unequal geographical spread of programmes across countries. Some DFID 
country offices have large economic development programmes, but the manufacturing components 
are relatively small (including Pakistan and Myanmar). Other DFID country offices have low spending 
on manufacturing programmes such as in Afghanistan, DR Congo, Caribbean, Lebanon, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Palestine OPTs, Tanzania, Somalia, Syria, Tajikistan, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. DFID country offices with no manufacturing programmes are Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan and Yemen.  
Only six DFID country offices implement large manufacturing support programmes, namely 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Rwanda and Uganda. Financial details of the programmes are 
presented in table 10. 
Table 10: DFID economic development in large manufacturing programmes.   







Yearly spend on 
manufacturing 
(C=B/6.5) *) 
Share of economic 
development spend for 
manufacturing (= 
C/A*100%) 
Bangladesh £42.5 million £61.8 million £9.5 million 22.4% 
Ethiopia £51.3 million £78.2 million £12.0 million 23.5% 
Ghana £41.5 million £18.0 million £2.7 million 6.7% 
India £44.2 million £36.1 million £5.6 million 12.6% 
Rwanda £57.0 million £19.0 million £2.9 million 5.1% 
Uganda £100.5 million £43.0 million £6.6 million 6.5% 
(Source: Annex 3 in the narrative summary Activity A)   
*) the average duration of manufacturing programmes is 6.5 years. 
 
As DFID aims to develop a more substantial portfolio of manufacturing support programmes, it should 
look to implement programmes with a primary and explicit focus on manufacturing in more countries. 
The last column in table 10 shows the share of DFID country offices spend on manufacturing as a 
                                                        
101 IMC. 2018. Analysis of DFID manufacturing programmes – Report Output A 
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portion of overall spending on economic development.  There may be a case for other countries which 
have not received significant manufacturing spend, but which do have significant manufacturing 
potential, to consider increasing this share towards a larger level of say 10-15% of the overall country 
budget for economic development.  
With the exception of the fragile states and conflict areas (Yemen and South Sudan for instance), there 
is likely to be a case for increased focus on supporting manufacturing activity, reflecting an analysis 
of revealed comparative advantage and investment attraction potential, as discussed in chapter 3. Table 
11 highlights those countries where DFID has low spending on manufacturing and assesses the case 
for it spending more there. It differentiates between resource-seeking, domestic/regional market-
seeking and global export efficiency-seeking manufacturing support programmes.  
Table 11: Countries where there is scope for manufacturing support programmes. 102   
 
 
Large potential Medium/low potential 
Resource-seeking  Zambia Zimbabwe 
Domestic/regional market-
seeking  
Indonesia, Jordan, Kyrgyz republic, 
Myanmar, Pakistan and Tajikistan. 
Iraq, Liberia, Nepal, Tanzania, 




Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon and 
Myanmar 
 





Fragile states (conflict) with 
low potential 
 
Afghanistan, DR Congo, OPTs and Sierra Leone, Syria, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Sudan and Yemen 
 
Manufacturing in larger private sector development programmes 
 
It is not only necessary to extend the number of programmes with a primary focus on manufacturing. 
With regard to programmes with a partial and limited focus or generic private sector component 
programmes, it is possible to include explicit manufacturing subsector(s) promotion components and 
the indicators mentioned in paragraph 4.1. There are for instance several very large DFID programmes 
where this can take place.  
 
One such example is the Private Investment Development Group (PIDG) implemented by the DFID’s 
central Private Sector Department (PSD).103 The 6-years programme’s budget is £415 million and 
aims to mobilise private investment in infrastructure, in order to increase service provision for the 
poor, boost economic growth, trade and jobs to alleviate poverty in the world’s poorest countries. The 
programme has a partial focus on manufacturing (estimated £103 million) but no prioritised subsectors 
or explicitly defined manufacturing targets.  
                                                        
102 The assessment of the ‘scope for manufacturing’ in table 11 is based on the author’s sources of information and 




Another programme of PSD is the co-funding of the CDC Group (public limited company).104 CDC 
is a development finance institution that provides patient capital equity and debt investments. DFID 
has provided £757 million over 23 years to catalyse the market for impact investment in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia. Impact investments are those which have both a financial and social return by 
benefitting poor and low-income people through improved access to affordable goods and services 
and income generating opportunities. A proportion of the funds which make direct investments into 
businesses that are highly developmental/transformative. The other part supports market building. 
Technical assistance is also being made available to the underlying investees. CDC explicitly monitors 
the number of manufacturing projects funded. DFID could consider encouraging CDC to explore ways 
of increasing its focus on manufacturing, for example through seeking a manufacturing-focused fund 
to invest in or stating its ambition to increase manufacturing as a share of its overall portfolio.  
 
5.2 Internal coordination of central DFID departments   
Explicit internal coordination of manufacturing programmes, in particular through collection 
and sharing of economic data on subsectors and indicators, would improve overall delivery. 
The analysis of DFID’s manufacturing and related programmes under the portfolio review highlights 
that the manufacturing support activities are scattered around the many programmes implemented by 
DFID country offices and central departments. Building on existing engagement across the 
organisation, improvements in the design, coherence, and effectiveness of these manufacturing 
programmes could be achieved through improved internal coordination, stronger gathering and 
sharing of information, and provision of analytical support. The planned ‘Invest Africa’ contract 
should help facilitate this. 
A logical step could be the establishment of an internal coordination point/platform that shares 
accessible information and comparable insights of manufacturing programmes and the associated 
support approaches, best practices and so forth. The further maintenance and updating of the existing 
database (spreadsheet) of manufacturing programmes (Output A) could be one activity. This database 
enables the publishing of regular summary reports presenting trends, outcomes, impacts, challenges 
etc. of DIFD manufacturing programmes. 
Moreover, the central point/platform could keep track of manufacturing research within the 
programmes (and more widely) and systematically store data. Most DFID programmes already include 
monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) and research components. Carefully designed, systematic 
manufacturing research could improve on this. This could include: 
- Research on subsectors, RCA and product space per country (paragraph 3.1) with a view to 
develop a central DFID database to be utilised by country office staff for the design of future 
subsector-focused manufacturing programmes and set programme targets accordingly. 
- Qualitative – quantitative research into selected subsectors and enterprise maps to identify and 
prioritise the binding constraints (paragraph 3.2). Such combination of qualitative (enterprise 
level) research with quantitative (macro/global) research will provide a rich evidence base for 
further policy and programme development in the manufacturing sector. 
                                                        
104 https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202939 
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- Specific MEL research on manufacturing-specific programme targets and economic indicators in 
the subsector (paragraph 4.1).  
Evaluation and comparison of this data would allow for the assessment of programme impact, value 
for money and the assembly of broader insights about the characteristics of, and opportunities and 
trends in manufacturing subsectors in each country. The engagement of the DFID Research and 
Evidence Division on manufacturing programmes could be an interesting option in this respect.  
5.3 External coordination with other donors and MOs     
Other donors and MOs work in a broad range of comparable activities in supporting 
manufacturing. There is no formalised overarching coordination framework between these 
organisations. DFID is well positioned to set up a coordination initiative. 
As described in the previous chapters, manufacturing support programmes best combine various 
inputs, addressing a comprehensive set of selected binding constraints, in order to achieve 
manufacturing specific targets. In the actual design and implementation of various support activities, 
there may be consideration as to whether DFID is the best positioned to provide the required support 
itself. A partnership with other donors or MOs drawing on complementary strengths may bring 
potential advantages, taking into consideration the respective core competencies of different donors. 
 
Under the DFID manufacturing programmes portfolio review, a separate report was produced in which 
a comparison of donor and MO support approaches is presented. The report shows that all the donors 
and MOs work in a broad range of comparable areas and activities in manufacturing support. Some 
donors have particular strength and experiences and have developed particular approaches for instance 
on industrial policy formulation (EQiUP of GIZ/UNIDO) or enterprise level support (kaizen JICA).  
 
At present, there are a number of combined efforts and co-financing arrangements involving DFID 
and other donors and MOs. However, there is no formalised overarching coordination framework to 
agree on coherence and complementary input frameworks for instance. Against the background of a 
comprehensive approach, it is advisable to promote further coherence among donors’ and MOs’ 
manufacturing support programmes with a view to specialise and complement each other. For this it 
is essential to agree on both higher-level policy and programme priorities in targeted subsectors and 
countries on the one hand, and individual strengths and related inputs on the other. 
 
Table 8 suggests a cooperation model that distinguishes between higher-level policy and programme 
priorities of each donor and the intervention approaches. Once the higher-level policy and programme 
priorities are clear and agreed, then donors individually can design their programmes that eventually 
lead to the commonly agreed ultimate objective: growth of the share of manufacturing within a 
country’s overall economy (GDP, employment export, etc.). 
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Annex A: Revealed Comparative Advantage methodology  
 
Comparative advantage is calculated from RCA defined as the share of an exported product in total 
exports relative to the share of the same product in total world exports. An RCA greater than 1 
indicates that the exporter has a comparative advantage in exporting a particular product; and RCA of 
1 implies that the exporter has no particular advantage relative to the world in exporting the products, 
whereas an RCA of less than 1 indicates that the exporter is not competitive relative to the world in 
exporting that product. 
Balassa’s definition says that a country is an effective exporter of a product if it exports more than its 
“fair share,” or a share that is at least equal to the share of total world trade that the product represents 
(RCA greater than 1).105 
One example: In 2010, soybeans represented 0.35% of world trade with exports of $42 billion. Of this 
total, Brazil exported nearly $11 billion of soybeans. Since Brazil’s total exports for that year were 
$140 billion, soybeans accounted for 7.8% of Brazil’s exports. By dividing 7.8% / 0.35%, we find 
Brazil has an RCA of 22 in soybeans, meaning Brazil exports 22 times its “fair share” of soybean 
exports so we can say that Brazil has a high revealed comparative advantage in soybeans. 
Technical breakout 
Formally, if X_{cp}Xcp represents the exports of product P by country C, we can express the RCA 
that country C has in product P as: 






                                                        
105 Balassa, B. 1965. Trade liberalization and ‘revealed’ comparative advantage. The Manchester 




Annex B: Industrial development bank – the case of Ethiopia 
 
The history of the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) traces back to the early 20th century. After 
numerous reforms, the bank was re-established in 2003 as part of the 2003 Industrial Development 
Strategy (IDS). Since then it has become the financial arm of the State, allocating loans to projects in 
industries selected by the government. Indeed, one of the peculiarities of this bank is its project-based 
form of financing. In 2011, DBE was one of 15 banks operating in the country. The strong link between 
the government and the bank is evident: the bank finances the industries identified by the government, 
and the board of directors that runs the bank is composed of seven senior government officials. While 
DBE’s annual reports do not provide data on loans disaggregated by industry, a list of the major 
projects financed by the bank is provided. Two examples from the manufacturing industry exemplify 
the bank’s activities and its role in industrial policymaking. 
The bank finances the expansion projects of various textile firms, a key industry in the government’s 
industrial plans. The low wages of the Ethiopian workforce, especially when compared with the rising 
wages in Asian countries such as China, are attracting various renowned international firms to source 
inputs and intermediate goods from Ethiopia. The expansion projects of both international and 
domestic textile firms have been financed by the DBE. The bank does not only support the textile 
industry by financing projects to expand the production of garments, but also the inputs required for 
production. For instance, chemicals are needed to treat cotton. These are generally imported, which is 
the reason why DBE supports firms that are willing to produce these in Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia has been growing rapidly over the last decades and its expanding industrial sector is attracting 
labour from rural areas. As a result of the housing boom, further sustained by the government-
promoted housing programmes, construction has been among the fastest growing industries in the 
economy. DBE also plays a role in this important industry by financing expansion programmes of 
cement producing firms. 








Annex C: Growth diagnostics according to Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco 
 
(Source: Hausmann, R., D. Rodrik and A. Velasco. 2005. Growth Diagnostics. Growth Lab Harvard 
University https://growthlab.cid.harvard.edu/publications/growth-diagnostics-0) 
The impact of growth-promoting policy reforms is heavily dependent on circumstances. Policies that 
work in some places may have weak, unintended, or negative effects in others. In this paper, 
Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco argue that this calls for an approach to reform that is much more 
contingent on the economic environment, but one that also avoids an ‘anything goes’ attitude of 
nihilism.  The key step is to develop a better understanding of how the binding constraints on economic 
activity differ from setting to setting. This understanding can then be used to derive policy priorities, 
in a way that uses efficiently the scarce political capital of reformers. 
While development is a broad concept entailing the raising of human capabilities in general, the 
authors believe increasing economic growth rates is the central challenge that developing nations face. 
Higher levels of living standards are the most direct route to achieving improvements in social and 
human indicators. Reform strategies should be principally targeted at raising rates of growth. 
Moreover, trying to come up with an identical growth strategy for all countries, regardless of their 
circumstances, is unlikely to prove productive. Growth strategies are likely to differ according to 
domestic opportunities and constraints. Across-the-board reform packages have often failed to get 
countries growing again.  
Lastly, it is seldom helpful to provide governments with a long list of reforms, many of which may 
not be targeted at the most binding constraints on economic growth. Governments face administrative 
and political limitations, and their policy-making capital is better deployed in alleviating binding 
constraints than in going after too many targets all at once. So, growth strategies require a sense of 
priorities.  
The method for growth diagnostics the authors provide in the paper should help target reform on the 
most binding constraints that impede growth. An approach to development that determines the action 
agenda on the basis of these signals is likely to be considerably more effective than a laundry-list 
approach with a long list of institutional and governance reforms that may or may not be well targeted 
on the most binding constraints to growth. 
The methodology can be conceptualised as a decision tree (see Figure 5, see below). It starts by asking 
what keeps growth low. Is it inadequate returns to investment, inadequate private appropriability of 
the returns, or inadequate access to finance? If it is a case of low returns, is that due to insufficient 
investment in complementary factors of production (such as human capital or infrastructure)? Or is it 
due to poor access to imported technologies? If it is a case of poor appropriability, is it due to high 
taxation, poor property rights and contract enforcement, labour-capital conflicts, or learning and 
coordination externalities? If it is a case of poor finance, are the problems with domestic financial 
















Annex D: Global Value Chains  
 
Today, most manufacturing activities and analysis takes place in the context of global value chains 
(GVCs). Consequently, DFID and other donors’ programme designs and theories of change aim to 
strengthen the position or elaborate the functioning of targeted manufacturing enterprises within value 
chains106. Understanding the broader chain context is critical to developing the programme ambitions 
accordingly. The ILO Value Chain Development Cycle tool suggests being explicit about the value 
position for setting ambitions and targets.107 
 
There are two types of GVCs involved in most programmes of DFID, donors and MOs:   
 
1. Promoting foreign direct investment (FDI)-based production units in global value chains (e.g. 
textiles, electronics, and pharmaceuticals). The product design and marketing typically take place 
elsewhere.  
These GVCs offer the possibility to create links with UK businesses, as well. The recipients of DFID 
support become UK trade partners in GVCs. The combination of support and creating commercial 
links with UK firms can benefit both the developing country and the UK. The Dutch government and 
USAID, for example, include mechanisms to link business partners from their countries to overseas 
partners in developing countries.  
2. Agro-processing units of primary products in local food and agricultural products value chains. 
Such value chains involve locally produced agriculture as raw material inputs. Support for the 
manufacturing industry is integrated into agriculture development.  
 
By comparing the DFID manufacturing portfolio (83 programmes) with its agriculture portfolio (71 
programmes), it shows that the 23 overlapping programmes do not focus much on economically 
transformative activity; rather they promote livelihood opportunities and non-transformational types 
of activity. The overlapping programmes are not focused on transforming agriculture enterprises into 
manufacturing enterprises. Most programmes integrate manufacturing into the agricultural activities 
as extra income generating activities for households.  
 
                                                        
106 Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J. and Sturgeon, T. (2005) The Governance of Global Value Chains. Review of International 





Annex E: Further references 
 





Higher-level industrial and manufacturing policies 
Other donors and MOs emphasise the importance of a solid framework of higher-level industrial and 
manufacturing policies. Acknowledging the importance of long-term industrial strategies at the 
highest policy level is critical for manufacturing promotion, according to the many insights and 
experiences of donors and MOs. The related technical assistance includes support to national 
institutions to implement trade and investment frameworks and to refine national industrialisation 
plans. This includes harmonisation and coordination of the government’s overall industrialisation, 
private sector, export support policies and programmes to name but a few. Several organisations 
supported by DFID manufacturing programmes, such as the International Growth Centre (IGC), 
prioritise specific industrial sectors and develop industrial/manufacturing policies accordingly. 
Table 7: Industrial policies on low income countries. 
Policy domain Instruments 
Market-based Public goods/direct provision 
Product market Import tariffs, export subsidies, duty 
drawback, tax credit, investment/FDI 
incentives  
Procurement policy, export market 
information/trade fairs, linkage programmes, 
FDI country marketing, one-stop shops, 
investment promotion agencies.  
Labour market  Wage tax credits/subsidies, training 
grants 
Training institutes, skills councils.  
Capital market Directed credit, interest rate subsidies Loan guarantees, development bank lending  
Land market Subsidised rental Eps, SEZs, infrastructure, legislative change,  
Source: Weiss (2015)  
Stimulate firm-level innovation 
Innovation is critical for the promotion of the manufacturing sector in LMICs. Manufacturing firms 
have to innovate and reposition to meet international competitiveness challenges. Even small-scale 
innovations are relevant, including incremental adoption and adaptation of new combinations of 
existing technologies. Enterprises adopt technologies that are relevant to the stage of development of 
the economies in which they operate. Innovation is often seen as carried out by highly educated labour 
in R&D-intensive companies with strong ties to leading centres of excellence in the scientific world. 
Seen from this angle, innovation is a typical “first world” activity. There is, however, another way to 
look at innovation that goes significantly beyond this high-tech picture. In this broader perspective, 
innovation – the attempt to try out new or improved products, processes or ways of doing things – is 
an aspect of most if not all economic activities. In this sense, innovation may be as relevant in the 
developing part of the world as elsewhere.  As described in emerging innovation theories on LMICs, 
much innovation depends on an aggregation of small insights and advances through ‘learning by 
doing’, and frugal and inclusive technological innovation, rather than on major technological 
inventions (Carayannis et al., 2003). 
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For the introduction of new technologies, developing countries can turn their backwardness into an 
advantage by borrowing or adapting technologies that have already matured in richer economies.  
Strengthen technical as well as managerial skills 
Strengthening the internal capabilities of manufacturing enterprises is an important area of attention 
in meeting the ‘premature de-industrialisation’ challenge. Industry 4.0 or the profusion of modern 
process technologies associated with the new production paradigm powered by robotics and labour-
saving technologies seem likely to hinder developing countries in expanding their share in global 
manufacturing.  Moreover, a rapid ‘servicification’ of the manufacturing sector is taking place. This 
changes the nature of the sector and requires more technically skilled and savvy workers, who take 
ownership and control in developing new future manufacturing approaches. In the long run, it is not 
expected that the manufacturing sector will offer labour-intensive growth opportunities. 
Although in the short term it is expected that a lot of labour-intensive work will be required in 
manufacturing, the outlook for the long run is a development towards more advanced technical as well 
as managerial skills. It involves a combination of the exposure to modern technologies and an 
entrepreneurial and creative attitude to finding manufacturing solutions. As one example, JICA 
stresses the importance of improving the management and production (quality) capability of firms via 
Japanese business concepts such as kaizen (continuous improvement). Human resource development 
is often not exclusively geared toward manufacturing. This refers to providing education and training 
for entrepreneurs and workers with a view to strengthening management and production quality 
capabilities. 
Capital accumulation 
In the DFID document ‘Economic Development Strategy: prosperity, poverty and meeting global 
challenges (January 2017)’, it is proposed that the City of London can become a leading financial 
centre for the developing world.  
 
